1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	JFK HOLDING COMPANY LLC,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 196 CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
8	Appellants.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
11	October 16, 2013
12	Before: CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
15	ASSOCIATE OUDGE EGGENE F. FIGOTI, UK. ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
16	Appearances:
17	
18	KATHY H. CHIN, ESQ. CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP
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24	
25	Penina Wolicki Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 196. Counsel, do you 2 want any - - - any rebuttal time? 3 MS. CHIN: Please, may I reserve two 4 minutes, Your Honor? 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes. 6 Go ahead, you're on. MS. CHIN: May it please the court, my name 7 is Kathy Chin from Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. 8 9 I'm here representing defendant-appellant, the 10 Salvation Army. 11 This is an appeal from a decision of the 12 Appellate Division First Department that upends two 13 very basic principles critical to the resolution of 14 commercial disputes in this state. First, that a 15 contract must be enforced according to its terms; and 16 secondly, that when a defendant moves to dismiss a 17 complaint, the facts alleged by the plaintiff must be 18 accepted as true - - -CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counsel, let me ask 19 20 you first. Where - - - where does Salvation Army fit 21 in to this whole commercial transaction in leasing 22 this space. What's their role as opposed to the role 23 of DHS? Who negotiated this?

MS. CHIN: This deal was negotiated between

DHS, the City of New York, and JFK, the owner of the

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1	property. The Salvation Army was only an
2	intermediary. The amended complaint describe
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do they stand in the
4	shoes of the City?
5	MS. CHIN: They are essentially an agent of
6	the City in this situation. They really do stand in
7	the shoes of the City
8	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Did they sign the
9	lease as an agent of the City?
10	MS. CHIN: No, they did not.
11	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So they signed it in
12	their own name?
13	MS. CHIN: They signed it in their own
14	name.
15	JUDGE READ: What about the
16	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did you have any
17	JUDGE READ: the services agreement?
18	What about the services agreement?
19	MS. CHIN: Services agreement was also
20	signed by the Salvation Army. But the intent of the
21	parties always was that the Salvation Army was to be
22	held harmless and was only an intermediary in this
23	transaction.
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You had some independent
25	obligations under the service agreement, didn't you,

in connection with the condition of the property? 1 MS. CHIN: The Salvation Army had 2 3 maintenance obligations under the services agreement, but limited to the budget it received. That was the 4 5 consistent theme throughout - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, didn't - - - didn't 6 7 paragraph 12 require you to keep the building in a certain condition? 8 9 MS. CHIN: But only to the limit of the 10 budget. And the services agreement, the services 11 agreement refers specifically to the budget, which is 12 the amount of money that the City of New York agreed 13 to give the Salvation Army through rates that were 14 negotiated, not by the Salvation Army, but between 15 the City and JFK. 16 The lease also provides for maintenance 17 obligations. It's a typical lease. You're the 18 tenant, you do have maintenance obligations. 19 JUDGE SMITH: Under the terms - - - under 20 the terms of the lease, did the landlord have to 21 accept the termination if the property was not in the 22 condition which it should - - - which you got it? 23 MS. CHIN: If it was not in the condition

that was appropriate under the lease, then indeed,

the lease would not necessarily be terminated - - -

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1	JUDGE SMITH: Okay.
2	MS. CHIN: effectively.
3	JUDGE SMITH: But in fact but
4	everyone seems to assume it is terminated. How did
5	it get terminated? Did they accept the termination
6	even though they say that they say the place is
7	a mess?
8	MS. CHIN: Well, they accepted the ten
9	million dollars.
10	JUDGE SMITH: Um-hum.
11	MS. CHIN: But whether or not they
12	JUDGE SMITH: I mean, could they
13	could they have said, thank you for your ten million;
14	we're going to apply it to your rent; you're still
15	the tenant?
16	MS. CHIN: They could have. But would that
17	have been
18	JUDGE SMITH: But they didn't?
19	MS. CHIN: They did not.
20	JUDGE SMITH: Um-hum.
21	MS. CHIN: No. I mean, they negotiated
22	with the City for almost two years after the
23	termination took place without the Salvation Army at
24	the table, trying to resolve their differences. They
25	were not able to, and JFK eventually sued the City.

1 JUDGE SMITH: And I take it you agree with the dissent below that you have no obligation - - -2 3 that you have no right to pursue the City for the 4 money that the majority said you should pursue them 5 for? 6 MS. CHIN: Right. I mean, that's a 7 significant point that the dissent makes. JUDGE SMITH: Do - - -8 9 MS. CHIN: We have no rights. 10 JUDGE SMITH: - - - do you agree that if 11 you did have that right under the service agreement, 12 you would - - - you would be liable if you failed to 13 enforce it? MS. CHIN: If, indeed, for example, the ten 14 15 million dollars had not been paid, yes, we would have 16 had an obligation. 17 JUDGE SMITH: And if you - - - if you had -- - it had not been paid through, because you - - -18 19 because you had failed to pursue the City for it, 20 then you'd be on the hook for the ten million? 21 MS. CHIN: Theoretically, if the ten 22 million dollars had not been paid, yes. I mean, 23 that's why we believe that clause is there. 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: That's - - -25 MS. CHIN: But that's not what happened.

1	JUDGE SMITH: but you would agree
2	that the the clause that there's an
3	exception to the clause that says you have no
4	liability or no liab no liability beyond the
5	rent. You do have liability beyond the rent if you
6	if you have a right against the City that you
7	fail to pursue?
8	MS. CHIN: Well, the "in the event"
9	language is not a condition precedent to the
10	limitation of liability. It's a separate,
11	independent covenant, and it applies only in very
12	particular situations.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But the
14	MS. CHIN: If indeed
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: ten million
16	dollars is your only obligation?
17	MS. CHIN: The ten million dollars
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You would have to
19	pursue them. Aside from that
20	MS. CHIN: Right.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: you have no
22	particular obligation and therefore, you can't be
23	held liable?
24	MS. CHIN: Right. I mean, the ten million
25	dollars was all that the City had to pay pursuant to

1 the terms of the services agreement. And the 2 language that is being referred to here, "in the 3 event that the amounts due have not been paid", those refer to the situation where something like the ten 4 5 million dollars had not been paid under the services agreement. Here it was. There was no obligation for 6 7 us - - -8 JUDGE SMITH: What remedy - - -9 MS. CHIN: - - - to enforce against the 10 City. 11 JUDGE SMITH: - - - does the landlord have, 12 in the event that exactly what they say happened did 13 happen, that the place is returned and is completely trashed? 14 15 MS. CHIN: Well, they should have - - there are many things that they could have done. I 16 17 mean, these documents were constructed in such a way that - - -18 JUDGE SMITH: Well, one of - - - one of 19 20 them, I suggest, is they didn't have to accept the 21 surrender. Is there anything else they could have 22 done? 23 MS. CHIN: They could, at an earlier point 2.4 in time, have said this building is going to wreck

and ruin. This is a - - - this is a default under

the lease, and we are terminating the lease. 1 2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Do you disagree with their 3 representation in the complaint that the building is inhabitable? 4 5 MS. CHIN: I don't believe there's actually a representation in the amended complaint to that 6 7 effect. I know that the majority opinion states that. I don't know what the situation of the 8 9 building is currently. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But your - - - but 11 your view is you don't have any responsibility for 12 that? 13 MS. CHIN: We don't have any responsibility, because of the limitation of 14 15 liability provision. 16 JUDGE PIGOTT: So your - - - your argument 17 is that once you knew the City was going to be 18 responsible for a maximum of ten million dollars, you 19 could do what you wanted, when you wanted, to the 2.0 extent you wanted, in that building, and you were not 21 responsible at all? 22 MS. CHIN: No - - -23 JUDGE PIGOTT: So if you - - - if you did 2.4 200 million-dollars'-worth of damage, which I guess

they're claiming you did, your answer is, that's too

1	bad. We can do anything we want, because the City's
2	going to pay them ten million dollars, and the rest
3	of it, that's too bad.
4	MS. CHIN: No. I mean, I don't think we
5	would say that, simply because this this
6	provision was in place from the very beginning
7	JUDGE SMITH: Well, if you had
8	MS. CHIN: of this deal.
9	JUDGE SMITH: if you had a tort
10	liability for destroying the City for
11	destroying the building, I assume that the lease
12	wouldn't protect you against that. If you burned it
13	down?
14	MS. CHIN: Well, to the extent that there
15	was the limitation of liability provision would
16	apply no matter what. I mean, the intention
17	JUDGE SMITH: No matter you mean
18	literally, if you burn it down
19	MS. CHIN: If
20	JUDGE SMITH: on purpose?
21	MS. CHIN: if we committed some kind
22	of a crime that would be
23	JUDGE SMITH: Or a tort? Or a tort?
24	MS. CHIN: truly an issue. But
25	actually there's a provision in the lease provides

if, indeed, some kind of a criminal liability was 1 2 imposed on the Salvation Army because - - -3 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, but - - -MS. CHIN: - - - of this - - -4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - most - - - most leases 6 -- I mean, if the tenant, you know, to use Judge 7 Smith's phrase, trashes the place, they're responsible. It doesn't make any difference whether, 8 9 you know, the lease ended or not. I mean, the 10 landlord goes in and realizes what's happened and 11 says, you know, you've done this damage. You're - -12 - you know, you were the tenant, you're responsible, 13 and you have to pay. MS. CHIN: But this - - -14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: And you're saying that 16 because you had a deal with the City to take care of 17 your lease and the payments and things like that, 18 that somehow you're absolved from any responsibility 19 for any activity that went on within the building. 20 You were - - - you had license to trash the building 21 up to ten million dollars. 22 MS. CHIN: This was an unusual situation. 23 I mean, there is language in the lease - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: You started your argument

saying this is standard lease.

MS. CHIN: Well, it should be interpreted in accordance with its terms, which is fairly standard; and a motion to dismiss should be treated in a fairly standard way. But, is this an unusual situation? Yes, it is, in many ways, because we were solely the intermediary here.

JUDGE PIGOTT: If you have a tenant who - - and you don't want to lease the property to them, but they say, well, wait a minute, I have a relative who's willing to pay the rent for me. So I have an agreement with my uncle to see that my rent is paid, and you nevertheless trash the tenancy, you can't say, well, I had an agreement with my uncle to pay and so you got to go after my uncle. I don't think that's true. I think if you damage the property, you're responsible. Isn't that logical in a standard lease?

MS. CHIN: This isn't a standard lease, because - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I thought that's the way you opened your argument.

MS. CHIN: I opened the argument by saying you had to enforce these contracts according their terms. And these contracts specifically make out, and the amended complaint confirms, that this is an

1 unusual situation. Salvation Army was solely the 2 intermediary. JFK and the City both understood that. 3 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: If there had not been the ten-million-dollar termination fee, and just the 4 5 standard lease form of you have to restore the 6 property to its pre-tenancy condition, would your 7 argument be the same? MS. CHIN: Yes. I believe that it would 8 9 be. I mean, the situation is such that pretty much 10 whatever happened at the building, we were supposed 11 to be held harmless. That was the deal. We entered 12 into the lease solely because we were going to 13 fulfill the services agreement - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is that provision in the 15 lease? MS. CHIN: - - - with the City of New York. 16 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is there a provision in the lease that said you're to be held harmless? 18 19 MS. CHIN: That's the limitation of 20 liability provision - - -21 JUDGE PIGOTT: In the lease? 22 MS. CHIN: - - - in the lease. Yes. 23 mean, that's the reference - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: So Judge - - - what Judge 25 Abdus-Salaam suggested to you, that you promised to

1	restore it to condition pre pre-tenancy, is not
2	there?
3	MS. CHIN: Oh, there is indeed a provision
4	in the lease that you should restore the building to
5	its pre-lease condition. Which does not involve
6	creating a new
7	JUDGE SMITH: But you but you say the
8	lease also says that if you breach that covenant,
9	your liability is limited to what you get from the
10	City?
11	MS. CHIN: Yes.
12	JUDGE PIGOTT: What what section was
13	that?
14	MS. CHIN: The limitation of liability
15	provision is actually the focus of the
16	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that paragraph 31,
17	you're talking about?
18	MS. CHIN: Yes, paragraph 31 of the lease,
19	at page 135 of the record.
20	JUDGE PIGOTT: And that's the provision
21	you're relying on?
22	MS. CHIN: Yes.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay.
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel.
25	You'll have your rebuttal time. Thank you.

1	MS. CHIN: Thank you.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor?
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: What's your interpretation
4	of paragraph 31?
5	MS. RECINE: Our
6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Doesn't that somewhat
7	impose a limitation based on what the Salvation Army
8	received from DHS?
9	MS. RECINE: It imposes a limitation on
10	- on what the Salvation Army receives from DHS. To
11	the extent the Salvation Army acts reasonably in
12	attempting to enforce its rights those are
13	exactly the words
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But what if they
15	don't have rights? Do
16	MS. RECINE: Well, that's if they don't
17	have rights. But we can discuss that. They
18	certainly have rights under the services agreement
19	and otherwise.
20	JUDGE SMITH: They have they have a
21	right to sue the City for the the for the
22	bad condition of the premises?
23	MS. RECINE: Correct. The
24	JUDGE SMITH: Which which clause is
25	that?

1 MS. RECINE: I would - - - I would point you to Article 6 of - - -2 3 JUDGE SMITH: Of the services agreement? MS. RECINE: - - - of the services 4 5 agreement. And I would - - - I would - - - I would 6 explain the responsibilities this way. Under the 7 services agreement, there are responsibilities for 8 maintenance, and they fall both with the Salvation 9 Army - - - the Salvation Army is actually supposed to 10 execute on the maintenance - - - appropriate 11 maintenance for the building. 12 The City - - - and my adversary pointed 13 this out - - - is supposed to fund that. Now, what 14 happens if you're a normal party to an agreement and 15 part - - - the other side, the City in this case, is 16 not doing what they're required to do, which is 17 properly fund the money needed to maintain the 18 property. Well, you sue the City under the services 19 agreement. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: So you're - - - you're 21 essentially agreeing with your opponent that the only 22 remedy here is through the City - - - that they - - -23 that you can't levy on any Salvation Army property,

income, or assets. All they have - - - what they

have failed to do is to - - - to make commercially

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1	reasonable efforts to collect money for you from the
2	City?
3	MS. RECINE: That's not entirely correct.
4	Our our position is this, is that it's clear
5	from the limitation on liability that their limit
6	- their liability will be limited to that of the City
7	if
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: Who whose liability
9	would be limited?
10	MS. RECINE: The Salvation Army's liability
11	will be limited, but only to the extent that it acts
12	reasonably to enforce its rights.
13	JUDGE SMITH: And I have they say
14	they have rights under Article 6, and I've now got it
15	in front of me. Which part of Article 6?
16	MS. RECINE: Article this is just an
17	example, and it connects to a
18	JUDGE SMITH: I'll take
19	MS. RECINE: different
20	JUDGE SMITH: one example is all I
21	need. Which part of
22	MS. RECINE: Okay.
23	JUDGE SMITH: Article 6?
24	MS. RECINE: So (C) says the contractor and
25	the Department so this is on page 182 of the

1 record: "The contractor and the Department shall 2 review annually the amount of payments made pursuant 3 to this agreement to determine the appropriateness of the rates based on any increase in the cost of 4 5 operating the facility." So in this particular instance - - -6 JUDGE SMITH: So you say that gave them a 7 right to sue the City for - - - for not - - - for 8 9 inappropriate - - - for inappropriate low - - -10 inappropriately low rates, if they were paying per 11 person? MS. RECINE: Clearly. And this is - - -12 13 this is the position that the Salvation Army just 14 took when standing here. They said look, we had 15 maintenance obligations, no question; but only to the 16 limits of our budget. And if our budget was too low, 17 well, then too bad for you. Well, that's not true, 18 exactly. Not too bad for us. 19 There was an obligation on the part of the City to fund this property appropriately. 20 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Who's the real party 22 The Salvation Army or the City? If you want 23 to recover against the City, what - - - how do you -

MS. RECINE: No, no - - -

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1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: view Salvation
2	Army?
3	MS. RECINE: no, we want to
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What is their role?
5	MS. RECINE: Their role is, they signed a
6	lease. They signed a lease with us. And when they
7	did that, they promised
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That you negotiated
9	with the City?
LO	MS. RECINE: That's neither here nor there.
L1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that you
L2	negotiated with the City?
L3	MS. RECINE: Among yes. We
L4	with the City as well as the Salvation Army read,
L5	reviewed, signed it. They signed this as in their
L6	own capacity. They didn't sign it as an agent of the
L7	City.
L8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, you did accept the
L9	ten-million-dollar termination fee from the
20	MS. RECINE: Well, actually
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: City. So did that
22	extinguish any of these claims?
23	MS. RECINE: Certainly not, and for two
24	reasons. One is that there's nothing in the
25	termination provision that says once you accept this

termination fee there are no other rights under this agreement. In fact, contrary to that - - -

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, did you periodically inspect the premises to determine that there wasn't reasonable maintenance efforts being undertaken before this termination?

MS. RECINE: Well, the - - - this happened in sort of one fell swoop. If you read the complaint, what happened was there were issues with maintenance of the property. We knew that, the City knew that. The City inspected. The City issued a report. It said you're doing a terrible job, Salvation Army, which should have been the Salvation Army's first cue to sue the City if it wasn't getting appropriate funding and that's why it wasn't maintaining the property.

As a result, the City terminated the services agreement. But under the services agreement, even after termination, the Salvation Army had six months in which to sue on the services agreement. It opted not to.

Within that six-month period of time, we wrote them three letters. We said we don't accept your termination.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, you said you don't

1	accept them. And is it your position today that the
2	lease has been terminated or not?
3	MS. RECINE: I think that we ultimately
4	accepted the ten million dollars. But our position
5	has always been
6	JUDGE SMITH: You seem to have trouble
7	answering that one yes or no. Has the lease been
8	terminated or not?
9	MS. RECINE: No, it hasn't been terminated.
10	JUDGE SMITH: You say the lease is still in
11	force, they should be paying monthly rent?
12	MS. RECINE: They should be doing a lot of
13	things that they haven't been doing.
14	JUDGE SMITH: Well, why aren't you just
15	suing for the rent if it's still in force?
16	MS. RECINE: We we are suing for
17	rent. That's one of the things that we're suing for:
18	rent, maintenance payments, all of
19	JUDGE SMITH: And you say you can take the
20	ten million and still keep the lease in force?
21	MS. RECINE: I don't re as of the
22	date of the complaint, we hadn't accepted the ten
23	million.
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: As I as I read the
25	record, and I could be wrong, I thought in August of

'05 the Salvation Army notified you that it was 1 terminating the lease effective in September. 2 3 MS. RECINE: It did. And in September we wrote three letters. We wrote a letter on the 5th, 4 5 the 9th and the 30th. On the 5th, the 9th, and the 30th, we told them you have not met your conditions 6 7 precedent to terminating. 8 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Have you accepted the 9 ten million now? You said as of the date of the 10 complaint you - - -11 MS. RECINE: I - - - I don't know the - - -12 actually standing here, I don't know the answer to 13 that question. I would assume that we have at this 14 juncture. Many, many, many years have passed. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Isn't that pretty 16 important whether you've accepted the ten million 17 dollars, or is that irrelevant? MS. RECINE: It's irrelevant. The - - -18 19 the termination - - - this is - - - the fact - - -20 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You can take it and 21 yet they still owe you rent now? 22 MS. RECINE: Correct. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You - - -2.4 MS. RECINE: Unrelated. Unrelated. We 25 have damages, much, much, much, much above ten

1	million dollars.
2	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But you're saying the
3	lease continues after you take the
4	MS. RECINE: But even if the lease
5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: ten million?
6	MS. RECINE: even if the lease didn't
7	continue
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But did it continue
9	or didn't it continue or is it still in existence?
10	MS. RECINE: I mean, we we
11	we're suing on it. It's still a valid contract
12	between us and the Salvation Army.
13	JUDGE SMITH: No, no, but you can sue on a
14	contract after it's
15	MS. RECINE: Correct.
16	JUDGE SMITH: terminated for breach.
17	Isn't that what it looks to me that
18	that's what your complaint looks like to me. It
19	doesn't look like a complaint saying I have a tenant
20	still in possession who's not paying the rent.
21	MS. RECINE: I think, perhaps it's a fair
22	reading. But I think
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm surprised that
24	their argument seems to be that no matter what they
25	did to your building, ten million dollars is the

- is the max and that you accepted that. The check 1 was in September of '08 - - -2 3 MS. RECINE: We did not accept it in September of '08, and that has certainly never been 4 5 our position. JUDGE PIGOTT: September of '05. 6 7 MS. RECINE: We've - - - that's never been 8 our position. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, it - - - it says - - -10 all right. It says the City pays ten million dollars 11 termination fee due pursuant to the services 12 agreement. So you never got the ten million dollars? 13 MS. RECINE: We're not saying we didn't get the ten million dollars. 14 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. 16 MS. RECINE: There are two different issues 17 here. JUDGE PIGOTT: They paid - - - I've got to 18 19 issues I want to bring to you. 20 MS. RECINE: Sorry. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: So that happened. All 22 right? Now, you go in and for the first time - - -23 and I'm not criticizing this - - - I'm saying all of 2.4 a sudden, you say holy cow, look at - - - look at the 25 damage that was done to our building.

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You seem to be arguing that you - - - the

City is responsible for that as opposed to saying the

Salvation Army's responsible for that, separate and

apart from the service agreement, which seems to be

solely monetary with respect to how the rent's going

to get paid and things of that nature.

MS. RECINE: We agree that we - - - when we - - - we agree with the Salvation Army that when we drafted this contract we said the following: the Salvation Army, your liability will be limited to monies paid to you by the City. But you don't get to just sit on your hands. The City is going to owe you money under the services agreement or otherwise, and you are obligated, in order to enforce that limitation of liability, you are first obligated to take commercially reasonable steps. And we didn't even say really what those commercially reasonable steps are.

JUDGE PIGOTT: So - - - so without saying this is what happened, what you're saying is the Salvation Army only owes what's due under the contract. If they trash the place, torch the place, or whatever, if you can't get that from the City, if the City said hey, that wasn't anywhere in the agreement that we had with the Salvation Army that

1 they were going to trash the place, so we're not 2 paying it, where are you? 3 MS. RECINE: Well, that would be di - - it would be different if we knew. You have to 4 5 transport yourself back into time during the six-6 month period while the services agreement was still 7 in effect. What they needed to do was make an effort 8 to try to recover. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. That's kind of my 10 point. I'm saying, whatever happens here, you're - -11 - you're arguing a commercial reasonableness vis-a-12 vis the service agreement. You're not saying the 13 City did its job, the Salvation Army accepted their 14 money, but separate and apart from that, not related 15 to or maybe even in breach of that service agreement, 16 they ruined our building - - -17 MS. RECINE: Well - - -18 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and they ought to be 19 responsible for that, not just from whatever the City 2.0 promised to pay them, but because they, separate and

MS. RECINE: Well, actually today, they are liable in exactly that way. And I'll explain why.

apart, as if they were a trespasser, ruined our

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building.

JUDGE SMITH: Do you have - - - do you have

1 any tort claims in your complaint, or are they all 2 breach of contract claims? 3 MS. RECINE: They're all breach of contract 4 claims. They are responsible today, and the reason 5 they're responsible today is the limitation of liability doesn't apply. That is our position. It 6 7 doesn't apply. It was eviscerated by their failure to take commercially reasonable action. 8 9 I thought - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: 10 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, you mentioned 11 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you said the opposite 13 thing. 14 MS. RECINE: No, I apologize. That - - -15 no, what I'm saying is that our position was, had they taken commercially reasonable actions, it would 16 17 have been in effect. Their failure - - -JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: What are those 18 19 commercially reasonable actions? You mentioned 20 before that they weren't spelled out in the 21 agreement. And you only have mentioned suing. Are 22 you saying that they could have asked the City to pay 23 the money - - - and by the way is it really 200 2.4 million dollars? Is that the amount you're asking

for? Or is that just what the Appellate Division - -

1	-
2	MS. RECINE: To rebuild the hotel, that's
3	what it would cost.
4	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: To rebuild
5	wouldn't it be simpler to just tear it down and build
6	a new building?
7	MS. RECINE: Well, that's that's the
8	argument is that 200 million
9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Is that the tearing
10	down?
11	MS. RECINE: to tear it down and
12	rebuild the building.
13	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So could the City
14	- my point is, though, could the City have merely
15	asked I mean, could Salvation Army have merely
16	asked the City to pay the money, and would that have
17	been commercially reasonable; and if the City said
18	no, that would be the end of their responsibility?
19	MS. RECINE: Our allegation is they did
20	absolutely nothing. So maybe that would be enough,
21	that's a question of fact for the trial court.
22	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But on a motion to
23	dismiss, you say that will wait for another day?
24	MS. RECINE: We've alleged on our mo

in our - -

1	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Or summary judgment.
2	MS. RECINE: in our complaint, we've
3	alleged they did absolutely nothing, and there's no
4	question that cannot be commercially reasonable.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: What prevented you from
6	going after the City at an earlier point in time when
7	you began to realize that the building was becoming
8	dilapidated? Were you not able
9	MS. RECINE: Well, certainly
LO	JUDGE GRAFFEO: to bring an action
L1	against the City directly?
L2	MS. RECINE: We brought an action against
L3	the City.
L4	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, I know. They were
L5	initially a party here. I'm saying earlier, before
L6	the alleged termination of the lease?
L7	MS. RECINE: We were negotiating we
L8	were negotiating daily with the City. This is not
L9	about our obligations. This is about the Salvation
20	Army's obligation under the lease.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
22	Thank you.
23	Counselor, rebuttal?
24	MS. CHIN: In response to a question from
25	Judge Lippman my opponent indicated that it was

neither here nor there that the lease was negotiated between JFK and the City. It is not neither here nor there. That is critical to an understanding of how this whole arrangement came to be.

2.4

Salvation Army was solely the intermediary here. The negotiations were done between JFK and the City of New York. Among other things, they were the ones who negotiated the rates of payment for services to be provided at the homeless shelter, which now apparently JFK believes were abysmally low. Well, that's - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, did the City

- - - did the Salvation Army ask the City to pay for
any restoration? Did they do anything or did they
just decide, well, our limit was the ten million
dollars, and that's it?

MS. CHIN: I have to assume for purposes of a motion to dismiss that everything that they are saying is true. But clearly somehow the ten million dollars appeared. It's not as if we did nothing.

And the other thing to keep in mind is that for this, you know, magical period around the time that the termination took place, Salvation Army was essentially told to back off. The City was going to negotiate with JFK. They were going to resolve this

problem between them. We were to have no place at the table, which had been the case from the very beginning. Those documents were not negotiated - - - the services agreement, the rates that were included in the services agreement, the lease, the lease rate, those were negotiated without the Salvation Army.

If there was too little money to be had there to maintain this building, it's not our fault. We were there solely to provide services. Actually, the limitation of liability clause in the lease mentions specifically that the Salvation Army was entering this lease solely in order to comply with its obligations to the City under the services agreement.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right, it reads - - - it reads like that. It reads like it's a service agreement where you've got a - - - the City is going to provide for these people. They've decided on this building, and they've decided that you're the ones that are going to oversee the services, so to speak.

MS. CHIN: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: And as you argue, the $-\ -\ -$ the money from the City to JFK was between the two of them.

MS. CHIN: Right.

2.4

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: The - - - the question I guess I have is, if you, separate and apart from this 2 3 agreement, which to me is just cash - - - I mean, 4 we're going to - - - we're going to pay for the use 5 of your building and the Salvation Army's going to do the - - - do the work on it. But if you 6 7 independently do something to damage the building, 8 isn't that separate? Because the service agreement 9 reads like it's a financial obligation type thing. 10 So that if the rent didn't get paid or something like 11 that, they can pursue the City. But in terms of actually destroying the 12 13 building, if that's their allegation, if the City 14 didn't do it, because they're not - - - all they're 15 doing is being - - - is paying money - - - can't the Salvation Army be found liable for that? 16 17 MS. CHIN: Well, that's not actually the 18 allegation - - -19 JUDGE PIGOTT: That's right. 20 MS. CHIN: - - - in the amended complaint. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: It's not. It's commercial 22 reasonableness. 23 MS. CHIN: Right. They're just saying that 2.4 we, the Salvation Army didn't go after the City when

25

we should have.

1	JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.
2	MS. CHIN: And as the dissent points out,
3	there was nothing to go after the City for. You
4	cannot be expected to bring a suit against a party
5	where you have no rights against the party. And the
6	City had, pursuant to the services agreement, paid
7	the ten million dollars. There was nothing that we
8	could do at that point in time. And we, in any
9	event, had been told
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
11	MS. CHIN: not to even engage.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you
13	MS. CHIN: Thank you.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: counsel. Thank
15	you both. Appreciate it.
16	MS. CHIN: Okay. Thank you.
17	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of JFK Holding Company LLC v. City of New York, et al., No. 196 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate

Penina waich.

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