Official Court Transcriber

1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	NASH,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 238
7	THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY,
8	Respondent.
9	
10	20 Eagle Street
11	Albany, New York 12207 October 9, 2013
12	Before:
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. PRESIDING JUSTICE KAREN K. PETERS,
16	APPELLATE DIVISION THIRD DEPARTMENT PRESIDING JUSTICE HENRY J. SCUDDER,
17	APPELLATE DIVISION FOURTH DEPARTMENT
18	Appearances:
19	LOUIS A. MANGONE, ESQ. Attorneys for Appellant
20	505 Greenwich Street, Suite 10B New York, NY 10013
21	GREGORY SILBERT, ESQ.
22	WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP Attorneys for Respondent
23	767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153
24	
	Karen Schiffmiller

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Number 238, Linda Nash v. 1 2 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. We have 3 to wait for - - - why don't counsel come up and sit, and we'll have to wait a minute for our other 4 5 colleagues to join us. Okay, we'll proceed. Counsel, do you wish 6 7 to reserve any time for rebuttal? 8 MR. MANGONE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you, 9 three minutes, if I might. 10 As this court is aware, Ms. Nash's final 11 judgment was entered in the IAS Court on January 15th 12 of 2010. And the Port Authority immediately took an 13 appeal, the only appeal it ever took from that 14 judgment, of the Appellate Division First Department. 15 Six days later after the final judgment in the Ruiz 16 case was entered, the Port Authority sought leave to 17 appeal Mr. Ruiz's judgment to this court. 18 Ultimately, it was eventually granted. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: They brought up 5015 20 motions, as I understand it, to set aside this 21 judgment? 22 MR. MANGONE: Yes, they did, Your Honor. 23 They did after they failed - - - after the Appellate 2.4 Division had held that it had abandoned - - - the

Port Authority had abandoned all of its affirmative

1	defenses, and after the Port Authority refused to
2	appeal from that decision. So not only did the
3	Appellate Division's affirmance of Ms. Nash's final
4	judgment, which is at June 2 of 2011, well before
5	this court decided Ruiz.
6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But isn't the issue before
7	us as to whether that statute applies to this
8	particular judgment? Whether the statute can be
9	-
10	MR. MANGONE: I believe that's one of the
11	issues, Your Honor.
12	JUDGE GRAFFEO: for vacature of a
13	final judgment?
14	MR. MANGONE: I believe, Your Honor,
15	because when the Appellate Division affirmed
16	JUDGE SMITH: Why why doesn't
17	subdivision 5 of 5015(a) read right on this case?
18	MR. MANGONE: Well, for two reasons, Your
19	Honor. One, the Ruiz decision was not a decision
20	rendered in this case, but more importantly
21	JUDGE SMITH: But it well, it was a
22	reversal modification of vacature of a prior judgment
23	or order upon which the order is based.
24	MR. MANGONE: I don't think so, Your Honor.
25	But if I could get to my second my second

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JUDGE	SMITH:	Sure

MR. MANGONE: The Appellate Division's affirmance of June 2, 2011, it vacated and superseded the interim order that you're talking about, which was the one Ap - - - entered in April of 2008, both in Ms. Nash's case, and then separately in the Appellate Division. So this court - - it's very clear that once the Appellate Division's affirmance of Ms. Nash's final judgment in 2011 sup - - - vacated and superseded the ori - - the earlier interim order - - -

JUDGE SMITH: You're saying that by affirming the - - - the final judgment, which included the damages component, the inter - - - the interim liability judgment, which was reviewed in this court, ceased to exist?

MR. MANGONE: No, no, it never was reviewed in this court, Your Honor. That's really one of the issues.

JUDGE SMITH: You say it was never reviewed in this court because it ceased to exist before we decided Ruiz?

MR. MANGONE: Well, with respect to Ms.

Nash, that's correct. The or - - - the order of 2008

1	was entered separately in Ruiz and in Ms. Nash's
2	case. Ms. Nash's case has always been separate, Your
3	Honor. For twenty years we've fought to keep it
4	_
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, you did you did
6	participate in the First's arguments
7	MR. MANGONE: Yes, I did, Your Honor.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: so what what
9	does that mean, in terms of
10	MR. MANGONE: Well
11	JUDGE GRAFFEO: analyzing the
12	situation?
13	MR. MANGONE: Well, I participated, Your
14	Honor. I sought to participate. As this court has
15	held, I was not a party. And actually, in the Ruiz
16	case itself, in a footnote, it said, although I was
17	allowed Ms. Nash was allowed to participate in
18	that appeal, she was not a party, and her case was
19	not within the scope of this court's reversal of the
20	April 2008 as to Ruiz.
21	JUDGE PETERS: Counsel
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: But getting getting
23	back I'm sorry; go ahead.
24	JUDGE PETERS: Counsel, in your at
25	Al00, in a letter to the court, you asserted, as I

1	understand it, that your client was a party
2	respondent.
3	MR. MANGONE: I I made that I
4	sought to have that happen, but I lost. And the Port
5	Authority asserted just the opposite, namely, that
6	she wasn't and could not have been.
7	JUDGE PETERS: I believe the Port Authority
8	asserted that she wasn't, prior to your
9	correspondence at A100. And as I understand it, that
10	you were calendared as a respondent, although might -
11	you might have been named not named a party
12	respondent. Am I correct so far?
13	MR. MANGONE: Your Honor, I believe I
14	don't have the day calendar for that day, but as this
15	court has already ruled, we were not a party to that
16	action.
17	JUDGE SMITH: Well, isn't it I mean,
18	the record looks to me as though you were a
19	respondent until after you had a final and
20	nonappealable judgment from the Appellate Division,
21	and then you said, you know what? I I don't
22	like being a respondent so much, good-bye.
23	MR. MANGONE: Well, no, Your Honor, the
24	real I
25	JUDGE SMITH: Which which was a good

1	idea. I mean, I give you credit for effort
2	MR. MANGONE: Well, I I
3	JUDGE SMITH: but isn't that what you
4	did?
5	MR. MANGONE: The letter I wrote when I
6	said we wouldn't participate in any further
7	proceedings, was because we no longer had an interest
8	in in the way the court might decide the Ruiz
9	decision, whether it would affirm it.
10	JUDGE READ: Because you had a final
11	judgment. You couldn't
12	MR. MANGONE: We had a final judgment which
13	was not appealed.
14	JUDGE READ: Yeah.
15	MR. MANGONE: Which had to be appealed.
16	Now
17	JUDGE SMITH: Weren't you weren't you
18	a respondent on Ruiz until the moment that you
19	decided you weren't anymore?
20	MR. MANGONE: Ab actually not, Your
21	Honor. We were allowed, as the court said, to
22	participate in the Ruiz appeal, but we were not a
23	party respondent. We couldn't have been. This
24	court's jurisdiction is with respect to parties
25	is very limited. I nobody could even have

stipulated it.

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JUDGE SMITH: You were - - - you were - - you say you were not a respondent on the Ruiz appeal,
because the judge - - - that is you - - - because the
judgment - - - the order granting you judgment on
liability was then - - - had been superseded by the
final judgment.

MR. MANGONE: Not - - - not quite, Your

Honor. The Port Authority - - - there were two

orders. There was an order entered in my case and in

the Ruiz case. The Port Authority never appealed the

order in my case to this court. It took one appeal

to the Appellate Division, which was exclusive - -
exclusive of any appeal to this court. So once - - -

argue that the reason why you should have the opportunity to brief and orally argue the Ruiz appeal was because you - - - your client could be affected by the decision of the Court of Appeals? And it wasn't until the Appellate Division decision was affirmed - - - your Appellate Division decision was affirmed - - - and before the Court of Appeals decision was rendered that you then said, I'm no longer a respondent.

MR. MANGONE: Not - - - not quite, Your

Honor. It - - - just to be clear about it. When I first asked to be heard on the Ruiz appeal, and wrote probably the letter you're talking about, more than nine months had passed since the Port Authority had filed its notice of appeal for the Nash final decision in the Appellate Division. And it was refusing completely to proceed.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Doesn't it get us back to the 5015 issue, in which there's a - - - there's an application to set aside this judgment based on 5015(a). And as Judge Smith pointed out, there's a decision upon which they base that, namely the Ruiz decision. And - - - but it struck me that the judge at that level didn't think he had any discretion at all.

MR. MANGONE: He - - - the IAS court that granted that motion didn't say he had any discretion. He said this court had already vitiated Ms. Nash's judgment when it - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: So in your view, did he misunderstand his authority under 5015 to say I can - - I can decide this in my discretion on a number of issues? Not simply because Ruiz is where - - - you know, is the final debate.

MR. MANGONE: I don't think so, Your Honor.

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I just think - - - I argued before that, Judge, he had a lot of - - - he had - - - in fact, the McMahon case the Port Authority relied upon, he didn't do anything like that. He said, the Port Authority - - - the Court of Appeals has done it, so I'm going to - - it's already done here; I'm just going to do what they say.

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you a softball. What I'm saying is that - - - that shouldn't it go back to him, so that you can make the arguments that you're making to us, which is they had - - - they had a lot of opportunities to do anything they wanted with respect to Nash, and granted, the paths seem to cross at some point, but in the interests of justice, or whatever the judge wants to do, if he has that type of jurisdiction, he could say I think that you should prevail.

MR. MANGONE: First, Your Honor, I did make those arguments. They fell on deaf ears. But to get back to the 5015 issue, once the Appellate Division affirmed Ms. Nash's final judgment, in a superseding order - - in which, by the way, it held that the Port Authority had waived all its defenses to the merits of Ms. Man - - Ms. Nash's claim, including the affirmative defense that it had a - - a

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1
          governmental immunity.
 2
                    JUDGE SMITH: Now, you say it was a
 3
          superseding order by the - - - what did it supersede?
 4
                    MR. MANGONE: It superseded the April 29th,
 5
          2008 order in the Appellate - - - the same court,
          which was a - - - which was a interlocutory order - -
 6
 7
 8
                    JUDGE SMITH: Has that - - - has that - - -
 9
                    MR. MANGONE: - - - as entered in Ms.
10
          Nash's case. That's the what the Aho - - -
11
                    JUDGE SMITH: Okay, help - - - help me,
12
          because I'm - - - I'm fuzzy on the details. April
13
          20, '08, the Appellate Division affirmed what, two
14
          different liability determinations?
15
                    MR. MANGONE: It affirmed the liability
          verdict rendered in the court, and - - - after a jury
16
17
          trial. And it - - - did it under two - - -
18
                    JUDGE SMITH: It was one - - - it was one
19
          judgment, a jury trial, in which both you and the
20
          steering committee - - -
21
                    MR. MANGONE: It was a verdict, yes.
22
                    JUDGE SMITH: - - - right after that?
23
                    MR. MANGONE: Yes, correct, Your Honor.
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                    JUDGE SMITH: And that's - - - and that's -
25
          - - and that order, that April 8 order, is the
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1 interlocutory order, which - - - which was later a 2 basis for a direct appeal to our court from the final 3 judgment of Ruiz. 4 MR. MANGONE: Only in the Ruiz case, not in 5 this case. The Port Authority did not take - - -JUDGE SMITH: But it's the same - - - but 6 7 it's the same order, right? 8 MR. MANGONE: I don't - - - it may be, Your 9 Honor, but Ms. Nash - - - for all these years, I've 10 had one client with one case on one specific set of 11 facts. 12 JUDGE SMITH: I guess - - - I guess I'm 13 having trouble seeing how that April 8 - - - April 2008 order was not an order on which your judgment -14 15 - - your final judgment was based? 16 MR. MANGONE: Well, it was, Your Honor. 17 But then it was superseded by the affirmance of 2011. 18 The Aho case in this court is very clear. That once 19 an interlocutory order - - - a judgment is entered on 20 an interlocutory order - - - the judgment and the 21 subsequent order supersedes and vacates the prior 22 interlocutory order. 23 And the only way the Port Authority could 2.4 possibly - - - could possibly - - - and this is, 25

again, in the Aho case - - - could possibly have

secured any review of the April 2008 order as in Ms.

Nash's case, was to appeal from the affirmance of her final judgment in the Appellate Division, which I repeat, not affirmance the Court of Appeals held, and the Port Authority admits it in its brief in this appeal.

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It - - - it abandoned all claims of error in Ms. Nash's final judgment except just to the assessment of interest.

JUDGE PETERS: Counsel?

MR. MANGONE: Yes, ma'am.

JUDGE PETERS: In your brief, you rely upon McMahon, as did the Appellate Division, and actually as does opposing counsel. It seems that everyone has their own interpretation of what McMahon means.

And in reviewing McMahon, I - - - I noted that there was a particular statement in that decision, where the court mentioned - - - which I think applies here - - - and that's my question, do you think the same facts apply here - - - "that there's never been a moment from the time of the explosion until today when the plaintiffs were not under legal notice that their claim of liability and any interlocutory or final judgment as to liability was still subject to review."

1 And I'm asking whether you agree that 2 that's the case here, because as you know, when the 3 Ruiz matter was before this court, you requested the 4 opportunity to be heard on the subject of liability. 5 MR. MANGONE: Yes. And let me ask you - -6 - answer that question in two words. No, Ms. Nash's 7 - - - when Ms. Nash's judgment was affirmed - - -8 when the Port Authority abandoned its defenses to her 9 claim, which it did when it appealed to the Appellate 10 Division ultimately, as I've said - - - because 11 that's what the Appellate Division held - - - Ms. 12 Nash's claim was no longer subject to being defended 13 against by any affirmative defense, let alone the 14 claim of immunity, which had been waived - - -15 irrevocably waived. 16 So there was a time when Ms. Nash's - - -17 when her - - - when her final judgment was affirmed, 18 her claim was never under any jeopardy from any affirmative defense such as - - -19 20 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Counsel, you'll have your 21 rebuttal. 22 JUDGE SCUDDER: What - - - what - - -MR. MANGONE: I'm sorry. 23 2.4 JUDGE SCUDDER: I just had a question. 25 JUDGE GRAFFEO: One more, please.

1 MR. MANGONE: Yes, Your Honor.

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JUDGE SCUDDER: What would the purpose of 5015(a)(5) be if you could not bring a motion to vacate under that section? Why have it then?

MR. MANGONE: Well, you have it, Your

Honor, for example, in some of the cases cited by the

Port Authority, where an arbitration award was en - -

JUDGE SCUDDER: Yeah.

MR. MANGONE: - - - was entered and a judgment confirming the award was entered. The arbitration award was vacated and so the judgment was vacated. That's - - -

JUDGE SCUDDER: But you say that it does not apply because your - - - the judgment that you have with Nash is final.

MR. MANGONE: Well, it's the same - - - the same parties and the same case where an order in exactly that case - - not another related case - - - was reversed. The law is very clear that an order that reverses - - - the same issue on another case, can't be the basis for an order reversal of a judgment that's been - - - of a - - - in a case that's been finally concluded, where A, the case is no longer in the pipeline, and B, the issue is no

1 longer in the case. And that was both - - - that was the 2 3 situation here, I think. The issue of lia - - - of affirmative - - - of, rather, immunity was no longer 4 5 in Ms. Nash's case when this court decided the Ruiz appeal, and her case in its entirety had been 6 7 concluded before this court decided the Ruiz appeal -8 9 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Thank you, counsel. MR. MANGONE: - - - from which it excluded 10 11 12 JUDGE GRAFFEO: We'll hear from you during 13 rebuttal. 14 MR. MANGONE: Thank you very much. 15 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Counsel? 16 MR. SILBERT: Yes, Your Honor. 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Aren't you trying to use 5015(a)(5) to substitute for a direct appeal that you 18 19 should have taken from the June 2011? 20 MR. SILBERT: We're not, Your Honor. We're 21 using 5015(a)(5) for exactly the purpose it was 22 intended, which is to make a motion, address at the 23 trial court's discretion to vacate a judgment that is 2.4 based - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: But is it too late - - -

1	but is it too late?
2	MR. SILBERT: No, Your Honor. In fact,
3	5015 is designed and intended to apply in exactly
4	these circumstances when
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But when the Port
6	MR. SILBERT: a judgment has become
7	final and after
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: The Port Authority was here
9	in the Ruiz case
10	MR. SILBERT: Yes.
11	JUDGE GRAFFEO: you were asked
12	specifically about the cases that had been settled,
13	that were final. And the indication was those cases
14	that were no longer in the pipeline would not be
15	subject
16	MR. SILBERT: We we
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: to the relief you
18	were asking for in Ruiz.
19	MR. SILBERT: We were asked about the cases
20	that had been settled, the settlements. That was the
21	question, and we said
22	JUDGE READ: So they're final they're
23	
24	MR. SILBERT: no, the settlements
25	would not be unraveled.

1	JUDGE READ: They're final
2	MR. SILBERT: We never said
3	JUDGE READ: They're final, but something
4	where there's a final judgment's not final.
5	MR. SILBERT: If what 5015(a)(5) says
6	expressly is if and it is intended to apply as
7	this court held in Lacks, in Huie, in James and a
8	number of other cases it is intended to apply
9	after final judgment and after direct appeals are
10	exhausted, if the judgment is based on an order that
11	is subsequently reversed, then the judgment itself is
12	subject to vacating. That is
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But all you had to do was
14	file a notice of appeal
15	MR. SILBERT: Your Honor, remember the
16	circumstances
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: after the June 2011?
18	MR. SILBERT: Remember the circumstances
19	that got us here. Ms. Nash wrote and these
20	letters are at page 90 93 of the record.
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But our our court did
22	not grant them respondent her respondent
23	status.
24	MR. SILBERT: We we now understand
25	that, Your Honor, but the but we believed, and

1 Ms. Nash believed, and wrote at page A100 of the 2 record, that the court had, because, remember, she 3 said, this is my - - - this is the order that granted me rights that is going to be reviewed in Ruiz. 4 5 is, without question, my rights as against the Port Authority are going to be controlled by the Ruiz 6 7 decision, so I should be a party respondent. 8 And we wrote back and said, you're right, 9 this is the order that granted you rights. You're 10 right; your rights are going to be controlled by this 11 decision, and you should be allowed to participate. 12 Our understanding of this court's finality 13 requirement was that she would be an interested 14 observer in amicus, not a party respondent. 15 JUDGE SMITH: So why - - - why do you 16 concede that she was - - - that we did not grant her 17 respondent status? 18 MR. SILBERT: The court - - - the court 19 ultimately said - - - I don't know if whether she - -20 21 JUDGE SMITH: Isn't - - - isn't our 22 ultimate decision consistent with the idea that she 23 was a respondent until she decided to stop being a 2.4 respondent?

25 MR. SILBERT: I - - - if there is such a

1	thing in this court's jurisprudence, then it is
2	consistent with that. We've never seen any example
3	of a role that Ms. Nash played in this appeal in any
4	other case before this court. She was ostensibly a
5	party, but not a party, but this much is clear. She
6	knew at every second because we were clear
7	- that her rights were being challenged. We never
8	said and never conceded that the Appellate Division
9	decision on June 2nd would in any way eliminate any
10	right for one
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: First of all, why didn't you
12	appeal?
13	MR. SILBERT: We didn't appeal, Your Honor,
14	because we understood that Ms. Nash
15	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But you could have filed
16	the notice of appeal and then maybe not perfected
17	once you decided
18	MR. SILBERT: Well, the the
19	JUDGE GRAFFEO: the subsequent issue.
20	MR. SILBERT: The appeal would be to this
21	court, Your Honor. We did understand that she was a
22	respondent already at the time.
23	JUDGE PIGOTT: But you were appealing
24	you appealed you appealed the interest.

MR. SILBERT: But - - -

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: In other words, you had 2 enough interest that - - -3 MR. SILBERT: That's right, and - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm almost done. 4 5 MR. SILBERT: Yes. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: You had enough interest in 7 the case to appeal the nine percent. It would have 8 been a small matter to have appealed the whole thing. 9 And for some reason, as your - - - your opponent 10 argues, you abandoned all of those. 11 MR. SILBERT: No, no, we absolutely did not 12 abandon anything. The - - - no - - -13 JUDGE PIGOTT: And that's shown in your 14 notice of appeal and in your argument that you - - -15 MR. SILBERT: It's shown in the - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm almost done. 17 MR. SILBERT: Yes. JUDGE PIGOTT: That's shown in the notice 18 19 of appeal and in the argument you made at the court 2.0 when you were arguing the nine percent? 21 MR. SILBERT: Yes, it is. In fact, we 22 represented clearly in our brief to that court that 23 the issue of Nash's liability was before this court 2.4 in Ruiz, and this court's Ruiz decision would control 25 liability to her. We also said that the only issue

1 before that court was interest. That's what 5501(a) 2 - - - 5501(a)(1) says expressly. It says an appeal 3 from a final judgment brings up for review any order 4 necessarily affecting the judgment provided that that 5 order has not previously been reviewed - - -JUDGE PETERS: Counsel? 6 MR. SILBERT: - - - by the court to which 7 8 the appeal is taken. So we had no opportunity to 9 address liability to the First Department - - -10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Counsel, Judge Pet - - -11 MR. SILBERT: - - - and the First 12 Department decision clearly said we didn't. 13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - Justice Peters is 14 asking you a question. 15 MR. SILBERT: Yes, Justice Peters? 16 JUDGE PETERS: What we could be seeing here 17 is some really good lawyering by plaintiff's counsel, because what he did was, he asserted that his client 18 19 had the right to be heard on the liability portion of 20 the Ruiz case, and at the time he made that 21 assertion, that makes sense, since his client's case 22 was before the Appellate Division, and if the 23 Appellate Division didn't decide his client's case

before the Court of Appeals decided the Ruiz case,

then his client would be affected by that

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determination. 1 2 But the moment the First Department decided 3 his client's appeal before the Court of Appeals 4 decided the Ruiz appeal, he said, okay, once the 5 thirty days is up, I'm golden, and I'm no longer a respondent. One might call that really brilliant 6 7 lawyering. 8 MR. SILBERT: Maybe it is, Your Honor, but 9 here's the problem with it. Section 55 - - - Section 10 5015 says expressly that if the order on which your 11 judgment is based is reversed, then even your final 12 judgment is subject to vacature. Now, Mr. Mangone 13 conceded - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, what are you - - -14 15 what are you relying - - - you rely on McMahon - - -16 MR. SILBERT: We rely on a large number of 17 decisions - - -18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - correct? 19 MR. SILBERT: - - - and - - -20 JUDGE GRAFFEO: But in - - - in the McMahon 21 case, there was a pending notice of appeal - - -22 MR. SILBERT: The - - in - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: While the - - - when the O'Connor case was being heard, there was a pending notice of appeal.

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1 MR. SILBERT: And in many other decisions 2 by this court, there was not a pending notice of 3 appeal. They were applied after final judgment and 4 after appeals were exhausted. But in McMahon, there 5 was a notice of appeal, and McMahon was a harder case 6 than this one, because the Appellate Division 7 affirmed liability after this court had reversed the judgment. So there was an affirmance after - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: But why - - - why did the - -10 - did the court in McMahon not rely on 5015(a)(5)? MR. SILBERT: I think for exactly that 11 12 reason, Your Honor. Because it had held - - - it - -13 - remember, in the Appellate Division, after this 14 court reversed the liability order, the Appellate 15 Division still affirmed the judgment. So it then - -- it was then, sort of, outside the mainstream of 16 17 5015(a)(5) but - - -JUDGE SMITH: But affirmed it without 18 19 prejudice - - - it affirmed without prejudice to 20 post-judgment relief - - -21 MR. SILBERT: And that's - - -JUDGE SMITH: - - - which sounds like a 22 23 reference to 5015. 2.4 MR. SILBERT: It probably was, and the 25 court arguably could've - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: Then it comes back and they 2 don't - - - and they seem to think 5015 - - - I mean, 3 this is Justice Silverman - - -4 MR. SILBERT: Yeah. 5 JUDGE SMITH: - - - who was rarely wrong -- - but he seemed to think that 5015 didn't apply. 6 7 MR. SILBERT: It's a puzzle. But let me 8 make one thing clear. The argument that a - - - that 9 the June 2011 Appellate Division decision superseded 10 the April 2008 order establishing liability, that was 11 waived. That was never argued below; it was not 12 argued in Ms. Nash's opening brief, and it's not what 13 was - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Everyone seems to be waiving 15 a lot things. 16 MR. SILBERT: Yeah, it's a - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Let me - - - let me ask you 18 about - - -19 MR. SILBERT: Yes, sir. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - 5015, and we said in 21 Woodson that a court can "vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interest of substantial 22 23 justice". Now it seemed that the nisi prius court 2.4 here felt that he did - - - had no choice, that based

on Ruiz, he had to vacate this judgment. Now

1 wouldn't you agree that he did have certain discretion here? He could have taken into 2 3 consideration all of the arguments that both of you 4 are making here and then say, in the interest of 5 justice, I think that it - - - that this judgment should be vacated or that it shouldn't? 6 7 MR. SILBERT: Yeah, I think it was clear in the briefing at the time that he did have discretion. 8 9 He wrote a very short decision, but it's even more 10 clear in the Appellate Division's decision that they 11 knew that they had discretion and he - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, no, they said - - -12 13 they said that he properly exercised, if I'm 14 remembering it right. 15 MR. SILBERT: Yeah, but - - -16 JUDGE PIGOTT: But he - - - it sounded like 17 he wasn't exercising any discretion - - -MR. SILBERT: All of the - - -18 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - because of Ruiz. 2.0 MR. SILBERT: I - - - I don't - - - I don't 21 think that's a fair reading. It is - - - admittedly, 22 it's a very short decision, but all of these 23 arguments were made at length to the Supreme Court 2.4 and I think he well understood that he had discretion 25 under both 5015 - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: So you acknowledge that even where an under - - - when an order on which a 2 3 judgment is based has been - - - has been vacated, that the judge has discretion to leave the order in 4 5 place? MR. SILBERT: We do, Your Honor. 6 JUDGE SMITH: And what - - - what sort of 7 factors would justify that kind of exercise of 8 9 discretion? 10 MR. SILBERT: I - - - they're not - - -11 they're not delineated in the statute, but the - - -12 in this case, I think the exercise of discretion to 13 vacate the judgment was well justified by the fact that Ms. Nash knew at all times during these 14 15 proceedings that the liability in her favor was 16 subject to challenge. She participated in all of the 17 proceedings to try to impose liability. She knew when she was up here - - -18 19 JUDGE SCUDDER: But - - -20 MR. SILBERT: - - - that this court's 21 decision would affect her liability. Yes, sir? 22 23 JUDGE SCUDDER: But - - - but how about 2.4 finality of judgment? That'd certainly be a reason.

MR. SILBERT: Well, Your Honor, 50 - - -

1	again, 5015 was designed as this court said in Lacks
2	
3	JUDGE SCUDDER: No, no, no. I'm talking
4	the discretion of the judge. If he decided not to
5	grant the motion, you could do it on the fact that
6	finality of judgments would be more important than
7	vacating the judgment?
8	MR. SILBERT: Well, that that
9	JUDGE SCUDDER: He could have done that,
10	could he not have?
11	MR. SILBERT: He may have. I don't I
12	don't know what
13	JUDGE SMITH: If he had waited a period of
14	years to make the same motion, presumably, it could
15	have been it could have been denied on the
16	ground that he waiting too long.
17	MR. SILBERT: Arguably, it could have been,
18	but in Woodson, for example, the motion was granted
19	years after.
20	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, how long can you wait
21	to bring a 5015(a)(5)?
22	MR. SILBERT: In this case we waited two
23	business days, Your Honor.
24	JUDGE GRAFFEO: For default judgments,
25	there's a one-year period in the statute, but you're

1 asking us to apply it where there's no time period. 2 MR. SILBERT: The - - - the - - - and 3 that's exactly what Professor Siegel says, because there is no time limit, because the grounds for which 4 5 vacature is justified can arise at any time. In this 6 case - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Before you go, and I know 8 your red light is on. 9 MR. SILBERT: - - - we brought it two days 10 after the - - -11 JUDGE PIGOTT: I suppose you're going to 12 keep talking. 13 MR. SILBERT: Yes, Your Honor. Yes. 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: Judge Tingling says, "The 15 holding in Ruiz specifically eviscerates any 16 judgments, holding or finding of liability involving 17 tortious liability on behalf of the Port Authority in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Accordingly, 18 19 the Port Authority's motion is granted." It sounds 20 like he didn't - - - he didn't take into 21 consideration all of the things that we're all 22 talking about here in an exercise of discretion. 23 sounds like he's saying that because we made a 2.4 decision, he had no choice.

MR. SILBERT: Well, Your Honor, he didn't -

- - he didn't address those in a written decision. 1 2 They were ar - - - they were argued in briefing and 3 in multiple sets of letters that the parties 4 submitted to the court. So he was certainly well 5 aware of them. And again, the Appellate Division has the - - - has the right, as you know, to substitute 6 7 its own discretion for that of the trial court, and 8 it reviewed this matter and the majority of that 9 court determined that the judgment was properly 10 vacated. 11 Yes, Judge? JUDGE PETERS: His use of the term 12 13 "eviscerate" doesn't feel discretionary. MR. SILBERT: Well, the - - - the - - - I 14 15 think it's - - - it's correct that the reversal of the order, the April 2008 order, which is the single 16 17 order that affirmed the single verdict that established liability in favor of every World Trade 18 19 Center plaintiff: Nash, Cantor Fitzgerald, everyone 20 else - - -21 JUDGE SMITH: You're saying that any other 22 23 MR. SILBERT: That's right - - -2.4 JUDGE SMITH: - - - any other result would 25 have been an abuse of discretion.

1 MR. SILBERT: Well, I - - - I think it probably would have. But the - - - but - - - but 2 3 look, it did eviscerate the only order that ever established liability in favor of any of these 4 5 plaintiffs. So what he said was absolutely correct. JUDGE PIGOTT: No, I mean, he could've - -6 7 - he could've said, you know, but - - - and - - - as 8 we keep picking on you about, you only appealed the 9 interest. You didn't - - - you didn't bring this one 10 in. You resisted their attempts to be part of it. I 11 mean, he could have made a lot of reasons that in the 12 interest of justice this judgment should have been -13 - - should have been sustained, and not say, as far 14 as I'm concerned, the Court of Appeals has decided 15 this case and you lose. I'm - - - I'm speculating, I 16 know. 17 MR. SILBERT: He could have done that, but again, it was clear at the time with the briefing 18 19 before him that he had discretion. All of these 20 arguments were made to him, and he decided to vacate 21 the judgment under both 5015 - - -22 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Let me ask you a global 23 question. 2.4 MR. SILBERT: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: Are there other judgments

1 that are in the same position as Ms. Nash? 2 MR. SILBERT: There are not other judgments 3 that are in the exact same position in the sense that 4 they have become final and relief has been sought 5 under 5015. There are - - - the - - -6 JUDGE GRAFFEO: There are some - - -7 MR. SILBERT: As you may know, Cantor - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - that are still in the 8 9 pipeline as to Ruiz? 10 MR. SILBERT: Cantor Fitzgerald - - - both 11 Cantor Fitzgerald and another plaintiff, Esposito 12 (ph.), have denied that this court's Ruiz decision is 13 effective as to them. JUDGE GRAFFEO: And the settlements, where 14 15 do they stand? 16 MR. SILBERT: They're - - - they're - - -17 as we told Judge Ciparik, nobody has ever contested 18 that a settlement where a party is claiming rights 19 under the settlement agreement and not under the 20 order that was vacated would be affected by this 21 court's decision. So, all - - - all of the settlements are final and undisturbable. The reason 22 23 this case is different is 5015(a)(5) says expressly 2.4 if the judgment is based on an order that is

subsequently reversed, then the judgment is subject

1 to vacature and that is exactly what happened. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: I'll leave alone after one 3 question, because - - -4 MR. SILBERT: Yes, Your Honor. 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - you mentioned that the 6 Appellate Division - - - they said the motion - - -7 the motion court did not abuse its discretion by 8 vacating a final judgment where the Court of Appeals 9 had reversed the interlocutory judgment of liability. 10 So it seems like they find that Judge Tingling did 11 not abuse his - - - his discretion. They didn't say, in the exercise of our discretion, we're going to 12 13 affirm it. I'm - - -14 MR. SILBERT: That's what they said, Your 15 Honor. I think - - - I think you're reading quite a 16 bit into a very short order. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. 18 MR. SILBERT: A few sentences. If he - - -19 you're making a, sort of, negative implication that 20 because he didn't discuss discretion, he didn't 21 realize he had it - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, as Judge Peters points 22 23 out - - -2.4 MR. SILBERT: - - - but I think it was 25 quite - - - quite - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - when he says that it

"eviscerates" it, it does sound like he's saying, you

know, where am I going? I've got - - - I've got no

authority here.

2.4

MR. SILBERT: Well, and again, I'm not - - I'm not sure under the circumstances that he would have any discretion to do anything else, but he certainly knew that the - - - a 5015 motion is addressed to a trial court's discretion and he knew all of the factors that have been brought up here today.

Let me just emphasize one thing. And - - JUDGE GRAFFEO: Very briefly.

MR. SILBERT: And please - - - please look at the Appellate Division order of June 2011 as to what it actually affirmed, because what it says is, it - - - it affirms "insofar as appealed from and as limited by the briefs". And - - - so it is affirming purely the interest rate under 5501(a)(1). We didn't even have a right to bring up liability again before that court. We didn't bring up liability. We told that court that Nash's liability would be decided by this court in Ruiz. Nash understood that. The Appellate Division understood that. Everybody has always known - -

1 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Thank you, counsel. MR. SILBERT: - - - that this court's 2 3 decision would determine liability. Thank you. 4 MR. MANGONE: Your Honor, what the Port 5 Authority has just said, and that's been its position 6 here, is that even though it filed a notice of appeal 7 from each and every part of Ms. Nash - - - of Ms. 8 Nash's judgment and its totality, and wrote to this 9 court and to the Appellate Division that on that 10 appeal, it reserved the right to argue every single 11 issue in Ms. Nash's case, including its liability to 12 her, including its affirmative defenses and under the 13 2008 order. It is now saying that it could voluntarily 14 15 limit that appeal, i.e. not raise issues of her 16 liability on that appeal, and reserve them, and raise 17 them at some later date under 5015. You cannot take 18 an appeal from each and every element of a judgment, 19 the judgment - - - any entered part thereof, and say, 20 well, we're only going to argue a couple of those 21 issues; we're going to abandon the others. JUDGE SMITH: Well, but it - - - it - - -22 23 it thought it was raising those issues before us in

25 MR. MANGONE: I don't think so, Your Honor,

the Ruiz case.

2.4

1	because then it wouldn't have said it reserved the
2	right to first of all, it couldn't.
3	JUDGE SMITH: You're not you're not
4	really saying, are you, that the Port Authority
5	intentionally abandoned the its position in
6	Nash and was content to let you collect your judgment
7	even when it won in Ruiz?
8	MR. MANGONE: Your Honor, I'm saying that
9	it did abandon a review of the merits of Ms. Nash's
LO	case itself.
L1	JUDGE SMITH: You're saying that's the
L2	legal effect of what it did. You're not
L3	MR. MANGONE: No, no, I'm saying it did it
L4	actually
L5	JUDGE SMITH: saying that when they -
L6	
L7	MR. MANGONE: because Ms. Nash's case
L8	presented the worst possible facts upon which this
L9	liability could be determined.
20	JUDGE SMITH: You're you're saying
21	that they intentionally decided to pay Ms
22	they'd risk paying Ms. Nash her money, rather than
23	have the case
24	MR. MANGONE: Exactly, because the
25	ramifications of its losing its appeal in Ruiz were

enormous.

2.4

JUDGE PETERS: But counsel, if - - - if
you're correct, then why did you even request the
opportunity to be heard on the liability issue before
the Court of Appeals? If in reality, you're saying
that all the Port Authority did in your client's
appeal was argue interest.

MR. MANGONE: Well, at that time, Your

Honor, it wasn't clear that that was what it was

going to do. At the time I wrote that letter - -
JUDGE PETERS: But now it is.

MR. MANGONE: At the time - - - no, at the time, I wrote that letter, my appeal was in limbo. I had no control over it. I was afraid that the Port Authority would rush to judgment in Ruiz and say, without any review - - - I always wanted my client's case to be as - - - to be determined on the facts - - - the particular facts of it. And I thought I was going to get that when the Port Authority appealed to the Appellate Division, because that's what it said it was going to do. At the end of day, it decided it wasn't going to seek that review in that court - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Were they - - - were they saying - - -

MR. MANGONE: - - - or in this court, by

1 the way. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Were they saying then that 3 they were waiving any of their - - - any specific claims as to Nash, but the - - - the immunity issue 4 5 was going up, because I don't know the facts of the 6 case. 7 MR. MANGONE: Well, Your Honor, what the effect of not briefing - - - and the Appellate 8 9 Division held this - - - they didn't brief or argue 10 any other error in Ms. Nash's final judgment except 11 this - - - the assessment of interest. JUDGE PETERS: Well, it sounds to me - - -12 13 MR. MANGONE: That's waiver and abandonment. 14 15 JUDGE PETERS: - - - like you're trying to 16 have it both ways. 17 MR. MANGONE: Pardon me? 18 JUDGE PETERS: It sounds to me like you're 19 trying to have it both ways. You're arguing they 20 only appealed the interest and therefore liability 21 was never at issue, but on the other hand, I filed a 22 hundred-page brief on the subject of liability and 23 demanded the opportunity to argue before the Court of 2.4 Appeals.

MR. MANGONE: No, I'm not saying - - - I'm

1 saying that when they appealed later, after I asked 2 to be a party to their - - - or to at least appear in 3 the Ruiz appeal, when they subsequently appealed, 4 they appealed from each and every part of Ms. Nash's 5 judgment, including the liability ruling. I didn't 6 know until they submitted their reply brief - - - and 7 actually their oral argument in the Appellate 8 Division - - - that they had actually had abandoned 9 any claim of error other than as to the interest. 10 JUDGE SMITH: Well - - - well, they 11 couldn't - - - they couldn't have briefed the - - -12 the issues the Appellate Division had already 13 decided, could they? 14 MR. MANGONE: Yes, they could. As a matter 15 of fact, they did it before, Your Honor, because the 16 issue is - - -17 JUDGE SMITH: Well, okay, people can brief 18 anything they want, but the - - -19 MR. MANGONE: No, no, Your Honor - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: - - - but the Appellate 21 Division was not going to recon - - - was not going 22 to reconsider what it already decided. 23 MR. MANGONE: I'm sorry, Your Honor, to 2.4 interrupt you, but the - - - that issue was decided 25 by Justice Sklar in 2004. That was not an issue in

the trial in which - - - the jury trial - - -1 2 JUDGE SMITH: I'm losing you. What was 3 decided by Justice Sklar in 2004? MR. MANGONE: Whether or not the Port 4 5 Authority had an immunity, a governmental function -6 - - a governmental function immunity, from any of the 7 clients. That was not an issue in the liability 8 trial. On the appeal from the jury's verdict, the 9 Port Authority raised that issue again - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: Oh, you're saying the 11 Appellate Division never - - - never decided 12 governmental immunity? 13 MR. MANGONE: It did - - - it did twice, because it affirmed Justice Sklar's decision - - -14 15 JUDGE SMITH: Oh. MR. MANGONE: - - - and then when the Port 16 17 Authority raised it again, on its appeal from the jury's verdict, where that was not an issue - - -18 19 they raised it again anyway - - - the Court of 20 Appeals again affirmed it. 21 JUDGE SMITH: I guess, I'm - - - I mean, 22 maybe - - - maybe we're getting - - - or maybe we're 23 spinning our wheels, but it - - - it seems to me 2.4 you're putting an awful lot of weight on the fact

that after the Appellate Division had already twice

1	decided, as you said, the governmental immunity
2	issue, and it was and it was at that moment
3	pending before the Court of Appeals, the Port
4	Authority decided not to brief it a third time,
5	because
6	MR. MANGONE: It could have said, Your
7	Honor, and it never did. Well, and by the way, it
8	never said it was reserving the liability issue in
9	Ms. Nash's case, because it was on it was on
10	appeal in this court, because it was ne it
11	never was. I could never have this court could
12	not have allowed me to be a party. It's Runcible v.
13	Haverstraw. This court's jurisdiction is
14	constitutionally limited. I could the court of
15	I could not have stipulated to the
16	JUDGE SMITH: You mean, after after
17	June 2nd, 2011, we could not have allowed you to
18	-
19	MR. MANGONE: No, never. That's what this
20	court held
21	JUDGE SMITH: Never? You mean, even before
22	
23	MR. MANGONE: Correct.
24	JUDGE SMITH: we did allow you.
25	MR MANGONE: Correct I asserted that I

should be, but I was wrong. The Port Authority said you can't make Mr. - - - Ms. Nash a party, and it was right, and it won on that issue.

JUDGE SMITH: But you stood here and argued, and - - -

2.4

MR. MANGONE: I argued because the - - - I

- - - the court said I could submit a brief if I want

- - - if I elected. And I elected, because at that

point, my case was in limbo. I had no idea what they

were going to do. I was afraid - - - and this has

always been my fear - - - that the Port Authority was

never going to - - - never going to submit the merits

of Ms. Nash's claim to review on the facts of that

claim, and that's what I've always wanted.

And that what I thought I was going to get when it appealed to the Appellate Division from her final judgment, which it decided not to do, and that's what it could have done, had it decided to appeal the affirmance to this court, which it again refused to do.

So you have a case of a party abandoning appeals, abandoning issues, and coming back later and saying, no, we reserved those issues. We have a right to rely upon those issues which we waived and abandoned, and seek dismissal of Ms. Nash's final

1	judgment affirmed and not appealed, on the ground
2	that we've already waived.
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Thank you.
4	MR. MANGONE: Thank you, Your Honor.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Thank you both.
6	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION

I, Karen Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Nash v. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, No. 238 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Hour Schoffmille.

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