1	COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEW YORK
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3	MATTER OF LANCASTER, et al., Appellants,
4	-against- No. 181
5	INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF FREEPORT, et al.,
6	Respondents.
7	MATTER OF GLACKEN, et al., Appellants,
8	-against-
9	INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF FREEPORT,
10	et al., Respondents.
11	20 Eagle Street
12	Albany, New York 12207 October 9, 2013
13	Before:
14	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
15 16	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
17	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
18	Appearances:
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1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 181, Matter of Lancaster. 2 Counselor, you want any rebuttal time? 3 MR. SPOLZINO: I would, Your Honor. Thank you. 4 Two minutes. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure. Go ahead. 6 MR. SPOLZINO: Chief Judge Lippman, and may it 7 please the Court, my name is Robert Spolzino, and I 8 represent the appellants in this case. 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, what's wrong 10 with Water Works requesting this provision as a condition 11 of settlement? 12 MR. SPOLZINO: There was nothing wrong with 13 Water Works requesting this as a condition of settlement. 14 What was wrong was when the Village attempted to impose 15 this charge for this - - - I'm thinking about the last guy 16 - - - to impose this condition on the appellants here and 17 then revoking their defense and indemnification when they 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's wrong with that? If you comply with the provision, they'll indemnify you, 2.0 21 and if you don't, you're on your own. What's wrong with 22 it from a policy perspective? 23 MR. SPOLZINO: Well, from a policy perspective -2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Policy and legal.

1	take policy first.
2	MR. SPOLZINO: Okay.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's wrong with it?
4	MR. SPOLZINO: From a policy perspective, it
5	says to public employees that they can be coerced not to
6	speak, that they
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but don't
8	aren't there restraints built in, in general, to public
9	employment?
10	MR. SPOLZINO: Well, if
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Don't you have certain
12	limitations on what you can do or not do
13	MR. SPOLZINO: Well
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: as a public
15	employee?
16	MR. SPOLZINO: If by that, Judge Lippman, you're
17	talking about the Garcetti limitations
18	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yes.
19	MR. SPOLZINO: those don't apply here or
20	haven't been satisfied. First of all, of the appellants
21	that are here, three or four all but two of them
22	were no longer public employees at the time this happened
23	So Garcetti has no application whatsoever in that
24	circumstance. The other two, one was the Village

treasurer and one was a trustee. There's nothing in this

record whatsoever that establishes a justification - - - a 1 2 public justification for restricting their free speech. 3 The burden is on - - -4 JUDGE SMITH: Doesn't the case - - doesn't the 5 case turn on where this - - - on who wanted this restriction? If the plaintiffs asked for it - - - I mean 6 7 the plaintiff in the other case, Melius, if he asked for 8 it, he demanded as part of a settlement, there's no 9 problem with giving it, is there? 10 MR. SPOLZINO: There's a problem from the 11 appellant's perspective, giving up their First Amendment 12 right to speak. 13 JUDGE SMITH: Even if it's a bona fide 14 settlement - - - part of a settlement demanded by a third 15 party? 16 MR. SPOLZINO: Right. There's nothing wrong 17 with two parties agreeing to a nondisparagement clause. What - - -18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but what - - - I 20 guess what I'm driving at is, you're right, your clients 21 don't have to agree to this, but then they don't have to 22 be indemnified. You follow what I'm saying? 23 MR. SPOLZINO: I see what you're saying, Judge 2.4 Lippman.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why isn't that a fair

1 trade-off? If it's so important to you, to the client, to 2 speak out on this settlement, so then fine, then you're 3 not indemnified and you go back and you say whatever you 4 want. 5 MR. SPOLZINO: Two responses to that. First of 6 all, it would be if the government could condition the 7 receipt of a public benefit on a waiver of a First 8 Amendment right, but it can't. That's very clear First 9 Amendment law. The second thing - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: But how - - - I mean, isn't - - -11 the question as you heard it, how do we know it's the 12 government doing it? 13 MR. SPOLZINO: Because the government, the Village, revoked their defense and indemnification. 14 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the government 16 didn't ask for the settlement - - -17 MR. SPOLZINO: No, but when they didn't agree -18 19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - to those terms in 2.0 the settlement. 21 JUDGE SMITH: You'd have a better case, wouldn't 22 you, if the facts were that some - - - that the new mayor 23 had had this bright idea, say let's shut up these old guys and write into this contract a noncriticism clause. 2.4 25 MR. SPOLZINO: Well, Judge Smith, I've been

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1	assuming the fact that Judge Lippman posited initially
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3	JUDGE SMITH: I understand. You say those are
4	the facts or at least they
5	MR. SPOLZINO: Those facts certainly aren't
6	established here.
7	JUDGE SMITH: You're saying you're saying
8	that on this record maybe he did, maybe that's what did
9	happen.
10	MR. SPOLZINO: I'm saying that the condition was
11	communicated there's nothing in this record that
12	says there was any discussion of the condition between the
13	plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit and the appellants.
14	JUDGE PIGOTT: Are you suggesting there should
15	be a hearing on that issue as
16	MR. SPOLZINO: I don't think there needs to be.
17	I don't think there needs to be, Judge Pigott, because I
18	don't think it matters
19	JUDGE SMITH: You think you are entitled to
20	summary judgment on this record?
21	MR. SPOLZINO: Absolutely, because what happened
22	is the Village then communicated this and attempted to
23	coerce the appellant into giving up their First Amendment
24	rights by saying take it or leave it, here's the offer.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What should they have

said? What should they have said?

MR. SPOLZINO: Well, first of all, Judge
Lippman, I think they should have gotten out of this
business entirely. They had made a decision six months
before that there is a conflict and that the Village and
Village Attorney Colton had to have separate counsel and
that the appellants had to have separate counsel.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, they did get out of the business, didn't they? They settled, and even after they settled, the plaintiffs still - - - in the federal action, still insisted on the nondisparagement clause.

And it's just you and - - - or they and your clients now who are involved in this.

MR. SPOLZINO: Right. But Judge Abdus-Salaam, what I'm saying is that if there - - - once the Village has settled out - - - has decided their separate counsel and has settled out of the case, they had no business being an intermediary in the settlement negotiation.

JUDGE SMITH: Well, what if they can't settle unless they get - - - unless they get your clients to sign on to the deal?

MR. SPOLZINO: Then the case - - - then the clients, who have the right to decide whether to settle the case - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Or to continue litigating at the

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Village's expense?

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MR. SPOLZINO: The Village has an obligation to defend and indemnify. It accepted that obligation.

JUDGE SMITH: The Village has agreed to defend and indemnify and they can't, and so your clients can be as hard-lined as they want and can say no, I'm not agreeing to anything that would restrict my freedom of action and continue - - - and continue to defend the case and the cost and judgment are all at the Village's expense. Is that fair?

MR. SPOLZINO: I don't think it's a question of fairness, Judge Smith. I think it's a question of the statute and the constitution. I think the statute says the only way they get out of defending and indemnifying, once they've accepted - - -

JUDGE SMITH: You're saying whether it's fair or not, it's their constitutional right?

MR. SPOLZINO: It's their constitutional right not to be forced or punished for waiving their First Amendment rights. And secondly, the statute says, failure to cooperate is the basis to get out, failure to cooperate in the defense. There's nothing in the statute - - -

JUDGE SMITH: Agreeing to a reasonable settlement isn't part of cooperation, in your view?

MR. SPOLZINO: Not cooperation in the defense.

It says - - - the statute says nothing about that.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, there's some question I -
- at least in my mind as to the fairness of the

settlement. I suppose if you don't - - - if you're one of

these people, I guess, that you represent and you don't

think it's fair, you apparently can't put that forward

because if you do, you're going to lose your defense, your

MR. SPOLZINO: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: And I don't - - - if I understand the facts here, you've got a seven million dollar lawsuit in federal court where there are incredible allegations - - I mean, there's an allegation, I think, in there that somebody's got two wives or - - I mean, it's almost scurrilous some of the things that are going on or that are said in there. And when you look at the face of it, when the plaintiff, who now all of a sudden gets referred to by his first name in the complaint as if he's Bambi, says he made a business decision not to pay his taxes. I mean, it just seemed to me there was a number of issues that should have been raised, and I'm not sure if I saw an answer. Was an answer filed in this case?

MR. SPOLZINO: Yes, yes. I don't know if it's in this - - an answer - - an answer in this case or in the underlying litigation?

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: The underlying litigation. 2 MR. SPOLZINO: I - - - I don't know. 3 JUDGE PIGOTT: Were deposition - - -But certainly not in this record. 4 MR. SPOLZINO: 5 Were depositions held? JUDGE PIGOTT: I believe there were. 6 MR. SPOLZINO: 7 has since been settled. I don't - - - I believe they got 8 through depositions. I wasn't handling that case, so I'm 9 not fully conversant with the facts of that case. 10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: If we agree with you, won't it 11 severely reduce the chances that municipalities can settle 12 any of the litigations that they have pending? 13 MR. SPOLZINO: Well - - -14 JUDGE GRAFFEO: If they - - - because it sounds 15 like they're going to need a hundred percent consent from 16 everyone on the town board or city council or whatever in 17 order to do any kind of settlement - - -MR. SPOLZINO: Judge Graffeo, I think that - - -18 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - where you have this kind 19 2.0 of clause if somebody doesn't like it. 21 I think that's what the statute MR. SPOLZINO: 22 requires, first of all. The statute could be changed if 23 that becomes a problem. I don't think it has been a 2.4 problem because we haven't seen any cases like this 25 before. Our research didn't reveal anything like this - -

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2	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But this is a fairly common
3	clause
4	MR. SPOLZINO: before.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: in settlements in all
6	kinds of litigation
7	MR. SPOLZINO: Right.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: even in especially
9	in even commercial litigation you see this
10	nondisparagement-type clauses.
11	MR. SPOLZINO: Right. But the different here is
12	this is the government. This is the government that's
13	subject to the First Amendment saying you have to stop
14	speaking or we're not going to pay you give you what
15	you're entitled to under the law. That's not permissible
16	The other issue here is the Open Meetings Law.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Not permissible when you
18	no longer work for the government. Is that what you're
19	saying?
20	MR. SPOLZINO: Right, because the government is
21	still subject to the First Amendment. It's and
22	there's nothing in the statute that says you don't
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: You can do other things that
24	will lose you your defense and indemnification rights.

MR. SPOLZINO: That's true, but I would say this

1 || way - - -

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: As a government employee.

JUDGE SMITH: Do you have an alternative argument? I understand you're saying that on this record, as a matter of law, you're entitled to judgment. Do you say in the alternative there are issues of fact as to the origin of where this clause came from?

MR. SPOLZINO: I think that if the Court finds it to be dispositive that - - - whether this issue came from the plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit or the - - - the Village, that then there is an issue of fact that has to be resolved.

probably won't have trouble with. It is pretty clear that if this was indeed, as I hypothesized earlier, this was the mayor's bright idea, and Mr. Melius couldn't have cared less whether this clause is in there or not, but the mayor insisted on it and got the plaintiffs to put it in, then you've got a pretty good case? You would agree with me?

MR. SPOLZINO: I would agree a hundred percent. But I also think we have a pretty good case, Judge Smith, on the Open Meetings Law question. The government can't act - - can't revoke defense and indemnification in private. There's no exemption for that.

1 JUDGE SMITH: Aren't you allowed to discuss 2 litigation in private? 3 MR. SPOLZINO: Well, first of all, we don't even know what they discussed because the record doesn't say 4 5 that, but what they did was revoke defense and indemnification, and that is a subject not of the 6 7 litigation, the underlying litigation but of the 8 relationship between the Village and its employee. 9 not a litigation matter. The statute has been construed 10 to say the purpose of the litigation exception is to 11 protect the municipality from having to reveal its litigation strategy. This has - - -12 13 JUDGE RIVERA: But to reach that conclusion, don't they have to think about how the appellants 14 15 conducted themselves during the course of the litigation? 16 MR. SPOLZINO: As far as - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - or failed to conduct themselves? 18 19 MR. SPOLZINO: As far as the underlying 2.0 litigation is concerned, Judge Rivera, they were out of 21 it, so they had no reason to discuss the underlying 22 litigation. As far as the - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, with respect to decide 2.4 whether or not they've cooperated.

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MR. SPOLZINO: Well, as far - - - but that - - -

1 but there's no litigation pending over that. That's - - -2 maybe that's a risk of litigation. 3 JUDGE SMITH: You're saying that litigation to which they are an indemnitor doesn't count as litigation? 4 5 MR. SPOLZINO: That - - - that's right because 6 they had no strategy to discuss in that case. They're - -7 - they're either going to pay or not pay. What's at issue 8 now is their relationship with the employee and the 9 indemnitee, and that's not litigation yet. The Weatherwax 10 case says the fact that somebody may sue you doesn't allow 11 you to act on the Open Meeting - - - on the Open Meeting 12 Law. Thank you. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor, you'll 14 have your rebuttal. Thanks, counselor. 15 MR. CAMHI: May it please the Court, my name is 16 Stanley Camhi. I represent the respondents. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, what is your 18 contention as to who requested this provision? 19 MR. CAMHI: I think it's clear from the record 20 there's only one conclusion that can be reached, and that 21 was that the Water Works plaintiffs insisted on this 22 provision, and the reason - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: What says that in the record? 2.4 MR. CAMHI: The way we know that, Your Honor, is 25 that if, in Mr. Edwards' affidavit - - - one of the

1 petitioner's affidavits, he says in the section entitled 2 "Undisputed Facts," he says that it was the Water Works 3 plaintiffs who insisted upon this provision. In the 4 Lancaster petition, paragraph 28 - - -5 JUDGE SMITH: You don't have an affidavit from 6 the guy who negotiated for the - - - the settlement for 7 the town, do you? MR. CAMHI: We have an affidavit from the 8 9 Village attorney who - - -10 JUDGE SMITH: Who says on information and 11 belief. MR. CAMHI: That's correct, because it really 12 13 wasn't - - -14 JUDGE SMITH: Who's his informant and why 15 doesn't that informant put in an affidavit? 16 MR. CAMHI: You have to go back and you have to 17 look at what was being alleged in the original petitions, 18 Your Honor. The Glacken petition really didn't even raise 19 First Amendment issues. 20 JUDGE SMITH: Right. 21 MR. CAMHI: The other petition did raise a very 22 limited First Amendment issue, but that petition also said 23 in paragraph 28 that it was the Water Works plaintiffs 2.4 that were insisting upon this provision.

JUDGE SMITH: You're talking about the Lancaster

petition.

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MR. CAMHI: The Lancaster petition. Paragraph
28 talks about the fact that after the Village was no
longer part of this litigation, there was a court hearing
in front of the magistrate judge in federal court, and at
that point - - -

JUDGE SMITH: But it says - - - it says that you offered to execute an unconditional stipulation that discontinues with prejudice. That offer was again rejected, and it's in the passive voice, but I gather that was in a meeting from - - - which the Village wasn't present, so it had to be the plaintiffs that rejected it.

MR. CAMHI: That's correct. If you could look at - - -

JUDGE SMITH: How do we know that it wasn't part of the previous deal between the plaintiff and the Village? Such things have happened. The Village says, oh yeah, I'll give you the money you want, I just want to be sure there's a clause in here that shuts up my political opponents. You agree that if that's the deal it's a constitutional problem?

MR. CAMHI: No, but I agree that it's a totally different case.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let's look at it a different way. Let's assume you got two parties that have

conflicts and that's - - - as Mr. Splozino points out, the Village has got lawyers for people that they have a conflict with. Now, the one half, pick a half, says we'll settle this case, this is great, but don't forget we're elected officials, and these people who we have a conflict with and have different lawyers are going to criticize us if we settle this by giving away three and a half million dollars of the Village's money.

So maybe you should put in here that no one can criticize it. And that's what happens - - - they don't sign, but the people who do, they praise the thing. They say, well, we got the Village out of trouble, we - - - it was a previous administration. They're disparaging the other half, and yet we're saying that's okay, you can disparage the other people - - - the other defendants, but they can't disparage you. And that seems to me to be a problem here, isn't it?

MR. CAMHI: Except that there's nothing in the record to support what - - - your hypothetical.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, Glackens was saying we saved a Village, we avoided, he says, millions of dollars of attorney's fees. I mean, he makes these broad statements that - - -

MR. CAMHI: Mayor Hardwick you're referring to?

JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm sorry, Hardwick, yeah. And

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so he's disparaging them, but this agreement apparently
has got to say but you can't fire back, you can't go after
your political opponents, you can't - - - you can't say I
would not have agreed to this because it's too much money
from the Village, and why would the plaintiff care? Why
would the plaintiff want to do this in the first place?

MR. CAMHI: Why would the Water Works plaintiffs care?

JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah.

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MR. CAMHI: Because if you look at the history of this, and there's a footnote actually included in the record, is this defamation action which occurred in which Mr. Glacken accused Mr. Melius, the Water Works plaintiff, of extortion. And my assumption is, which is the assumption that the Village attorney also stated in his affidavit was that Mr. Melius had a concern that he did not want the petitioners here to continue to defame him.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, that's separate though. I mean, this was Water Works, Inc., and I don't know, was he suing personally, too, Mr. Melius?

MR. CAMHI: Yes, he was.

JUDGE PIGOTT: And so he could say selling any and all causes of action, and you get the general release from here until the end of time, and that takes care of that. He can say anything he wants, but you're going to

say, well, then he settled. But why would - - - I mean, why wouldn't you then say no disparagement from whoever you say was defaming Melius as opposed to Lancaster and the other people who - - - MR. CAMHI: Well, this was a condition that was

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MR. CAMHI: Well, this was a condition that was being insisted upon by the Water Works plaintiffs. I have to go back to what the record says here. They don't put in anything into their affidavits in opposition to our papers that it was the Village that was insisting upon this.

JUDGE SMITH: Is this - - - I've been thinking of this as a summary judgment motion. Is it really a summary judgment motion or were the petitions found insufficient on their face or is this something else?

MR. CAMHI: No. I think the petitions were found to be, yeah, insufficient in all because we - - -

JUDGE SMITH: So we should view this - - - I realize you don't have it in an Article 7 - - - we view this essentially as a 3211 motion that was granted?

MR. CAMHI: I would - - - I would say that's true, Your Honor. The problem with the petitioner's argument here is the ramifications that this could have almost every jurisdiction in the state because what it basically says is that a government employee who - - - for whatever reason they choose, they can reject a settlement.

1 They can reject a settlement and take - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the First 3 Amendment rights that your adversary is talking about? MR. CAMHI: Well, I think that - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Are there anything 6 impinged here? Why is it not a - - -7 MR. CAMHI: No, I think it's - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - restriction on First 9 Amendment rights? 10 MR. CAMHI: I think their First Amendment 11 arrangement actually is illusory because, again, the 12 record does not support that it was a Village that was 13 insisting upon this. 14 JUDGE PIGOTT: If you sue the Village, all 15 right, and the Village settles, it doesn't make any 16 difference what the minority says. I mean, it - - - they 17 lost, Village settles. If on top of that you say, well, 18 there's a conflict here between two parties, and the one 19 party wants to settle, the other one doesn't, so if we put 20 a - - if we put a nondisparagement clause in so that we 21 take the settlement and they can't complain, you're 22 infringing on their speech rights, whether it's 23 constitutional or not, but that happens all the time when 2.4 you're dealing with the government. 25 MR. CAMHI: Exactly.

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JUDGE PIGOTT: And I mean, I was a county attorney for four and a half years. We settled every - - not every day, but a lot. Sometimes the legislators didn't like it, but we didn't ever put in a settlement "and by the way, you can't criticize." You got outvoted. It's 10 to 8. We settled, complain all you want.

MR. CAMHI: As the government, I would suggest that you're correct, you wouldn't put that in. But that's not what happened here, and there's nothing in the record to suggest it did.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But even if the plaintiff wanted to - - -

MR. CAMHI: Water Works plaintiffs?

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and the majority in the legislature says we're buying that, then it's over, and it's done.

MR. CAMHI: If the government employee has total discretion, unfettered discretion to decide under what conditions he's going to settle, that basically means he takes control of the Village treasury. He usurps what the board of trustees, what the trustees are elected to do, and that is to determine what is the best interest of the Village and how the taxpayers' money should be spent.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, let's assume you only have one defendant, you've got the Village, all right, not the

individuals - - -

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MR. CAMHI: Right.

JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and there's no conflict, and you want this nondisparagement clause and they agree to it. There's no problem, right? And all these legislators can complain all they want. It's the Village that's got the nondisparagement which means that they can't pass a resolution saying this was badly negotiated or anything else, but the individuals can say anything they want and do, and that's the way it is.

MR. CAMHI: Well, here, we would never tell - - we never told the petitioners they could not say what
they want. They wanted to engage in what we viewed as a
personal agenda. They had a personal agenda here. The
Village was able to fashion a settlement which ended the
lawsuit, exposed them to no monetary obligation, did not
require them to admit to any wrongdoing, did not expose
them to any third-party liability.

JUDGE PIGOTT: If they thought that the new mayor was colluding with the plaintiff to get more money than the lawsuit was worth, this settlement, wouldn't you agree, would prevent them from ever mentioning what they believed was a collusive settlement?

MR. CAMHI: Well, first of all, there's nothing in the record to that, but up until the point that the

settlement is signed, they certainly had a right to speak out and do and say whatever they felt about the settlement, including Mr. White who was the trustee.

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During the debate, during the negotiations, during the Village's determining whether or not to enter into the settlement, certainly he had an opportunity to speak out and voice his opinion with regard to the settlement. He had the ultimate ability to criticize that settlement by voting against the settlement as a trustee if he felt that it was inappropriate. And in fact, he didn't vote against it, he simply abstained.

So the limitation that was actually placed in this stipulation of discontinuance which was going to be between the Water Works plaintiffs and the petitioners without the Village's participation in that document, that was a very limited restriction on their ability, and those types of restrictions, as Your Honor said, are common in settlement negotiations, clauses that limit a party's ability to discuss the terms of the settlement.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Not in my experience as a government lawyer, but I'm no expert on all of that. But let me ask you this. If you've got a - - let's take an auto accident lawsuit where there's a plaintiff and there's two cars that are involved and they want to settle the whole thing, and the plaintiff says, well, I'll settle

it only if both sides say they won't criticize the amount, and one of them says I'm not liable, I'm not signing anything, and you agree with the one, you can't tell the other one that they're no longer entitled to be - - - to continue their lawsuit or to be indemnified if that's, in fact, what was happening because you got a conflict there, right?

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MR. CAMHI: Well, if you're talking about whether an insurance company can disclaim coverage where one of its insureds refuses to - - - or insists upon a confidentiality provision, for example, I think that was one of the cases that was actually cited here, and the Southern District said that that type of objection was illusory and yes, the insurance company can disclaim coverage under that.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But not if you've got conflicts.

In other words, if you got two cars both insured by

Allstate and this one says I'm not liable, I'm not

settling, and you say you - - - and Allstate says, well,

you have to settle because we're settling with our other

insured. They say, well, that's irrelevant to me, I'm

being sued separately and I think this is a bad

settlement. So it would seem to me that Allstate's got a

conflict, and they can't tell the other defendant what to

do. Isn't that what we have here?

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MR. CAMHI: Well, if it goes into a litigate - -- I'm sorry. If it goes into a litigation strategy as to who is ultimately going to become responsible for a particular payment, that would be true, you could not - -- the insurance company, if we're talking about insurance companies, could not take a position which would be adverse to its client.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Right.

MR. CAMHI: But that's really not what we have here. And what I think has to be recognized is Mr. Glacken put in an affidavit which is before this Court, and basically what he said in his affidavit was, I settled this case - - - ultimately settled this case because I could not proceed because of the possibility I may face financial ruin for myself and my family. Well, that is exactly why the Village needed to settle this case, to get a global settlement to avoid the possibility of financial ruin for the Village, and they needed to have the petitioners cooperate with them. And under the Public Officers Law, there's an obligation for cooperation. unless they cooperated, we could not get this global settlement, and the reason - - -

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Should we read the cooperation so narrowly as to be only with respect to a defense of a litigation, as your adversary has suggested, or is there a broader reading?

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MR. CAMHI: Once the Village has done what it's obligated to do under the Public Officers Law, and that is to defend and indemnify them to the point that the case can be resolved without any money being paid by them, without any admission of wrongdoing by them, without any - - without any provision which subjects them to greater liability to third parties, for example, and once that happens and if they reject it because they want to pursue a personal agenda that they may have, they have violated the cooperation clause, and the cooperation clause has to be viewed in conjunction with the gift and loan clause in the state constitution, because what's happening there, there would be no public purpose in continuing the litigation at that point in time.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. Thanks, counselor.

Counselor, rebuttal?

MR. SPOLZINO: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

I'd submit that the Village can't violate the

First Amendment to save money. That's what the Village's

argument is here, whether - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Practically speaking. If you're not going to have to pay any money, if the case has already been settled, if three and a half million's gone

1	or on its way or whatever, why is anybody continuing in
2	this thing?
3	MR. SPOLZINO: Because First Amendment rights
4	have value, Judge. They have no rights
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean, why wouldn't they just
6	walk away and say, fine, go disparage, go do what you
7	want, we got our money, we're happy?
8	MR. SPOLZINO: I don't know, but they have a
9	First Amendment right. That has value. And whether the
10	Village is insisting on this and punishing the plaintiffs
11	punishing the appellants because they've insisted or
12	that right
13	JUDGE SMITH: You've alleged that in your
14	petition?
15	MR. SPOLZINO: I'm sorry?
16	JUDGE SMITH: Does the petition allege that they
17	that the Village insisted on this to punish the
18	appellant?
19	MR. SPOLZINO: I think it's inherent in what the
20	
21	JUDGE SMITH: You think it's a fair inference
22	from the petition?
23	MR. SPOLZINO: Fair inference from what they
24	did. When they said accept it or else and the appellants
25	said else, they revoked it. But whether they're doing it

1 because somebody else wants it or because they want it, the Village did it here, and whether or not there are - -2 3 - there may be other conditions that would not be 4 noncooperation or that would be noncooperations here, the 5 condition can't be a condition that violates the First 6 Amendment. 7 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, if we adopt what 8 you're saying, then the Village, as I think one of my 9 other colleagues said, or a municipality will never be 10 able to settle a lawsuit as long as one of its current or 11 former employees feels that the settlement is not in that 12 person's best interests and would like to discourage or 13 disparage the settlement, if there is an insistence on a 14 nondisparagement clause. Why would we do that? 15 MR. SPOLZINO: Because the First Amendment gives 16 them the right to say it, Judge. They have a 17 constitutional right to say it. 18 JUDGE READ: So you'd have to litigate to the

JUDGE READ: So you'd have to litigate to the last taxpayer's dollar?

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MR. SPOLZINO: When the condition is a violation of the First Amendment or takes away First Amendment rights - - -

JUDGE READ: Yes? It is - - - your answer is yes then, that - - -

MR. SPOLZINO: I think the answer is yes, Judge

1 Read. The - - - they - - - the government - - - they have 2 an entitlement to a benefit that the government can't take 3 away because they insist on being able to speak. That's the essence of the First Amendment. 4 5 JUDGE PIGOTT: Is this defense that you're 6 providing to them individually? In other words, let's 7 take Vilma Lancaster - - -8 MR. SPOLZINO: In the underlying litigation? 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah. 10 MR. SPOLZINO: Yeah, the Village was defending 11 them individually. 12 JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. Was there any reason 13 why - - - I mean, I know they were sued individually and as officials, but isn't that a conflict too? I mean, I'm 14 15 - - - I would think that you can defend them personally 16 and the Village is over doing its own thing. So if they 17 settle with the Village, they get their money, what's the 18 point in going forward after that? I mean, I'm missing 19 this. 20 MR. SPOLZINO: I don't - - - I can't honestly 21 say I know enough about the underlying litigation, Judge 22 Pigott, to answer that question. There may be - - - there 23 may have been Monell (ph.) issues or something like that

JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean - - -

that - - -

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1	MR. SPOLZINO: separated the two.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: couldn't they have been
3	dismissing everything they're alleging that we did we did
4	in our official capacity and there's nothing here for us
5	to be in the lawsuit for?
6	MR. SPOLZINO: That might very well be, but I
7	don't I can't honestly tell you the answer to that.
8	Thank you.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counsel, thank you.
10	Thank you both.
11	(Court is adjourned)
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1	CERTIFICATION
2	
3	I, David Rutt, certify that the foregoing
4	transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of
5	Matter of Lancaster v. Incorporated Village of
6	Freeport and Matter of Glacken v. Incorporated
7	Village of Freeport, No. 181 was prepared using the
8	required transcription equipment and is a true and
9	accurate record of the proceedings.
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