COURT OF APPEALS 1 2 STATE OF NEW YORK 3 -----4 PEOPLE, 5 Respondent, 6 -against-No. 5 7 RAFAEL L. BELLIARD, 8 Appellant. 9 ------20 Eagle Street 10 Albany, New York 12207 January 2, 2013 11 Before: 12 CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN 13 ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ 14 ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. 15 16 Appearances: 17 DAVID R. JUERGENS, ESQ. OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 18 Attorneys for Appellant 10 North Fitzhugh Street 19 Rochester, NY 14614 20 KELLY C. WOLFORD, ADA MONROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 21 Attorneys for Respondent 47 Fitzhugh Street South 22 Rochester, NY 14614 23 24 David Rutt Official Court Transcriber 25

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 5, People v. 2 Rafael Belliard. 3 Okay, counselor, go ahead. MR. JUERGENS: May it please the Court, 4 5 David Juergens. I'm representing Mr. Belliard. I'd request three minutes for rebuttal, if I could. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure. Go ahead, 8 counselor. 9 MR. JUERGENS: The bottom line on Mr. 10 Belliard's appeal is that he may not have pled guilty 11 if he had been advised that he was getting a twelve-12 year mandatory consecutive sentence. 13 JUDGE READ: So what should the judge have done? 14 15 The judge should have MR. JUERGENS: 16 advised him that if he pleads guilty and this is a 17 twelve-year sentence that under 70.25(2-a), this is 18 going to be mandatory. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: If we unwind the facts a 20 little bit - - -21 MR. JUERGENS: Sure. 22 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - and he'd taken the 23 plea before the federal sentence, and as I think you 24 know, everybody waits for the feds because you can't 25 make them concurrent if they're - - - if the federal

1 comes after the state, would that have been an error 2 by the judge? I mean, is he supposed to advise the 3 defendant, if you have any federal cases pending get 4 them cleaned up before this because you can't make 5 them concurrent? The federal case is almost a 6 MR. JUERGENS: 7 red herring here because what we're focusing on is 8 the undischarged state sentence. 9 I know, but what I was JUDGE PIGOTT: 10 looking at is your argument is the judge should have 11 inquired, found out that there was this undischarged 12 parole violation that he's doing time on, find out 13 the quality and quantity of it and then advised the 14 defendant, as long as you understand this is 15 consecutive to that. 16 I'm just thinking - - - let's assume that's 17 not there but the federal charge is and he's taken a 18 plea. If he takes the - - - if he gets sentenced - -19 - if he takes the plea, I guess, under federal, 20 before the state, there - - no, if he takes the 21 state before the federal, the federal will not be - -- will not be concurrent and - - -22 23 MR. JUERGENS: Well, we wouldn't have a 24 direct consequence in that circumstance because 25 mandatory consecutive sentencing only applies if you

1 have a state - - -2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. 3 MR. JUERGENS: - - - undischarged sentence. 4 JUDGE PIGOTT: But should the judge advise 5 any defendant, if you have any federal case - - - my 6 point is at what point do we stop saying to the 7 judge, assume what should really be counsel's job, 8 which is to investigate, find out what the sentencing 9 structure is here, the situations, advise your client 10 and then come on in. 11 MR. JUERGENS: I would stop at the nine 12 categories of predicate felony offenders that apply 13 to 70.25(2-a). You have discretion to run a state sentence concurrent or consecutive to a federal 14 15 sentence, and under the case law Wilson v. McGinnis, 16 you don't have to advise of a - - - that the sentence 17 may be consecutive because there's discretion 18 involved. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: But there isn't the other 20 way, is my point. I don't think that the feds are 21 going to make their sentence concurrent with the 22 state. 23 MR. JUERGENS: Well, this is the state 24 court judge advising regarding - - - and again, I say 25 that federal matter is a red herring because our sole

focus is on the fact that there's mandatory 1 2 consecutive sentencing when you're talking about an 3 undischarged state sentence and you have another state sentence. And the reason is because those two 4 5 sentences are fundamentally connected. Well, is there - - - there's 6 JUDGE READ: 7 no question - - - the judge didn't know, did he? 8 MR. JUERGENS: The judge in this case, I 9 think - - - there's all over the record that he knew 10 - - - first of all, what I would say is the trigger 11 for the court's constitutional duty to make an 12 advisement is when he has knowledge that this person 13 is a predicate felony offender. And that's very clear; that's on the record. It's also clear that -14 15 16 JUDGE READ: You mean he could have figured 17 it out from the dates and so forth? 18 MR. JUERGENS: Well, no, I don't think the 19 judge has a duty to get into the dates or advise the 20 defendant of exactly what it's going to mean if the 21 sentence is consecutive or concurrent. What the 22 judge has to do is say that, okay, I've been advised 23 by the district attorney that you're a second-felony 24 offender, and it's clear from the record because 25 there was a parole detainer; he was held on a parole

1 detainer. It was - - - there was an undischarged 2 sentence. 3 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is it the violation of the 4 PRS? What's the undischarged sentence? 5 MR. JUERGENS: The undischarged sentence, he was being held on a violation of the PRS, and he 6 7 owed the state - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: I was trying to find in the 8 9 record, where does this record tell us that he was 10 charged with a violation of PRS? MR. JUERGENS: Well, it - - - the defense 11 12 attorney refers - - -13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - because I couldn't find it. 14 15 MR. JUERGENS: - - - the defense attorney 16 refers to it as a parole violation. 17 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, in the minutes of the 18 proceeding, the defense attorney was more concerned 19 with what was going on in federal court. 20 MR. JUERGENS: True. 21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: I didn't find that that 22 attorney ever mentioned anything about the violation 23 of PRS. 2.4 MR. JUERGENS: He mentioned that there had 25 been a pre-trial conference with the court and the DA

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1 and that they were going to run this twelve-year 2 sentence concurrent with - - - and he characterized 3 it as a state parole violation. And we know from the 4 second-felony offender statement that there was, in 5 fact, an undischarged prior state sentence because it was six months before he picked up this charge and 6 7 there was no way - - -JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, I guess I'm trying to 8 9 figure out what's the rule you're looking for because 10 is a judge in every instance going to know - - -11 MR. JUERGENS: The rule that - - -12 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - that they need to 13 give this type of warning or alert the defendant to 14 this type of situation? Are they always going to 15 know the background of the other pending charges? 16 MR. JUERGENS: All the judge would have to 17 know, initially, is that the person is a predicate-18 felony offender. Once the judge knows that, and 19 we're in a plea situation where there should be a 20 discussion between the defense attorney and - - -21 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Okay. So what is it you 22 want to judge to - - - what's the rule? What is it 23 you want the judge to announce - - -24 MR. JUERGENS: The rule is to announce - -25

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: if they know
2	MR. JUERGENS: that this twelve-year
3	
4	JUDGE GRAFFEO: if he or she knows
5	that it's a predicate?
6	MR. JUERGENS: This twelve-year sentence
7	will be consecutive to any outstanding undischarged
8	sentence.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So every time there's
10	a predicate felon, they should say that's your rule.
11	MR. JUERGENS: Every time.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
13	MR. JUERGENS: Every time.
14	JUDGE SMITH: The record I mean, the
15	record you were just referring to says that at
16	79, the defense lawyer was saying, we talked about
17	having sentences that would be running concurrent
18	with any federal and state violations of parole and
19	probation. And then he says, I think this court had
20	indicated that if Mr. Belliard pled it would agree to
21	sentence concurrent with the federal court. Isn't it
22	can't you infer from that that everybody knew
23	that he couldn't do concurrent he wasn't going
24	to do concurrent and couldn't do concurrent with the
25	state court?

1	MR. JUERGENS: I don't think you
2	necessarily have to read the record that way because
3	no one
4	JUDGE SMITH: I mean, it casts doubt on
5	your saying that he might not have pled if he knew he
6	was going to get consecutive.
7	MR. JUERGENS: Well, I again, I
8	wouldn't read the record that way because you have a
9	general default rule that if nothing is said at the
10	time of sentencing, then state sentences are going to
11	be concurrent with each other. And if, in Mr.
12	Belliard's mind, there's the possibility of
13	concurrency, we go to sentencing, nothing is said,
14	then he has the idea that it's going to be
15	concurrent.
16	JUDGE READ: I have one more question. In
17	Harnett, we said that we had should never
18	we talked about direct consequences, and we said they
19	are essentially we've limited them to the core
20	components of a defendant's sentence, term of
21	probation or imprisonment, term of post-release
22	supervision, and a fine. So you would ask us to
23	extend that?
24	MR. JUERGENS: I would ask you to include
25	that concurrent sentencing concurrent or

1 consecutive nature of a state sentence is an integral 2 part of the sentence which was the language in K2 and 3 was Chief Judge Lippman's language in Sergio Rodriguez from last year where he talked about that a 4 5 consecutive or concurrent nature is - - - it's an integral part of the sentence and - - -6 7 JUDGE READ: Okay. 8 MR. JUERGENS: - - - that was undisputed by 9 the majority in that case. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks, 11 counselor. 12 MS. WOLFORD: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 13 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor. 14 MS. WOLFORD: May it please the Court, 15 Kelly Wolford on behalf of the District Attorney's 16 Office of Monroe County. 17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, does it 18 cast doubt on the voluntariness of this if the judge 19 did not make clear that in this situation where 20 there's a predicate felon? 21 MS. WOLFORD: No, not in this situation and 22 I - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? Why isn't 2.4 this precisely the kind of situation where the judge 25 should make clear that fact?

1	MS. WOLFORD: Well, first of all, I think,
2	Your Honor, we have to speak of the lack of
3	preservation of the defense argument here and the
4	effect that it's having on the court's ability to
5	actually find out what happened in this case. Here,
6	we have a direct appeal from a conviction where the
7	defendant never asked to withdraw his plea before the
8	trial court and never filed a 440 motion to expand
9	the record.
10	JUDGE SMITH: But you don't have to
11	we know you don't have to preserve K2 claims when you
12	don't know about them.
13	MS. WOLFORD: Correct. You don't have to
14	preserve well, you still have to make the
15	motion.
16	JUDGE SMITH: It's hard to preserve
17	for starters, it's hard to preserve the objection,
18	hey, you forgot to tell me something I don't know.
19	JUDGE READ: Right.
20	MS. WOLFORD: And when you have the post-
21	release supervision cases, there's a there's
22	two different lines of cases. You have the post-
23	release supervision cases where they're not advised
24	at the time of the plea that they're going to get
25	post-release and then the court imposes it, in which
1	

case the defendant has to make the motion before - -1 2 - and the record is pretty clear for direct appeal. 3 And then you have the cases - - - the whole line of cases where it was not discussed ever, where it 4 5 wasn't discussed at the time of the plea. The 6 defendant wasn't sentenced in open court to the post-7 release, and then it comes up because DOCs imposed it 8 once they got to prison. And then those cases came 9 by - - - came to you by way of a 440 motion. 10 Here, we have none of that. We have no 11 indication on the record. The court is completely 12 silent on consecutive or concurrent time. The 13 defendant never made a motion to withdraw his plea 14 either during the course of the pendency of the case 15 or after the case was resolved and there was a 4 - -16 - he never brought a 440 motion. So here we have a 17 complete lack of record as to what actually happened 18 at that point. And as a result, we're in this 19 situation where we truly have no idea if this 20 individual was subject to an undischarged term of 21 imprisonment.

There is no place in the record that establishes that he was actually subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time that he was sentenced here. The record is completely devoid

1 of where he stood on the other charge at the point in 2 time. 3 JUDGE SMITH: Well, can't you just figure 4 it out from the rap sheet - - - I mean, from the 5 numbers? 6 MS. WOLFORD: You can't, Your Honor, 7 because as you are very aware, once a parole detainer 8 is filed, parole proceeds on its own outside of the 9 criminal justice system, and the prosecutor and the 10 courts are not involved whatsoever. At any point in 11 time, he could have resolved his parole violation 12 with, say, agreeing to nine months and it could have 13 been over by the time that we got to the time we're 14 at now. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But your adversary 16 suggests that there should be a rule that if it's - -17 - if you know that it's a predicate felony situation, 18 that, therefore, you know that there could be a problem with it in that it would be - - - it would 19 20 make sense to - - - in every situation like that to 21 at least raise that. 22 MS. WOLFORD: Okay. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that a bad rule? 2.4 Is that a good rule? 25 MS. WOLFORD: Well, I think it's just

1 slippery slope rule. I think at - - -2 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why? 3 MS. WOLFORD: Because our courts are 4 burdened with everything that they have to come 5 forward and tell the defendant at the time they enter 6 a guilty plea. 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but defendants 8 have rights. That's the whole point. 9 MS. WOLFORD: Absolutely. 10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So - - -MS. WOLFORD: And that's why this - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So it's not that 12 13 great a burden if it's a central right that the defendant has. 14 15 MS. WOLFORD: And that's exactly why this 16 court has distinguished between a direct consequence 17 of a plea and a collateral consequence of a plea and 18 has - - -19 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What could be more 20 direct than this, though? 21 MS. WOLFORD: Well - - - and it actually -22 - - in Gill v. Greene, this court talked about this 23 exact - - - this exact statute. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: At the plea stage? 25 MS. WOLFORD: I'm sorry?

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: At the plea stage?
2	MS. WOLFORD: No. It was under a different
3	context, but what happened
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but I'm saying
5	at the plea stage, if this automatically happens and
6	immediately happens, how could it not be a direct
7	consequence?
8	MS. WOLFORD: Well, Your Honor, first of
9	all, I think we have to make
10	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: It's not a rhetorical
11	question.
12	MS. WOLFORD: No, I understand.
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Tell me how it could
14	not be a direct consequence.
15	MS. WOLFORD: Well, I think there's a lot
16	of reasons, and let me go through them, just
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Sure, go ahead.
18	MS. WOLFORD: I'll move past the
19	preservation thing just but I do think it's
20	important because I do think that it complicates this
21	case, and I know that the issue of whether or not a
22	defendant needs to be advised of whether or not his
23	sentence is concurrent or consecutive is an important
24	issue, but here I suggest that the court doesn't have
25	the proper record to make that determination because

of lack of preservation.

2	But with respect to the argument about
3	voluntariness, first I want to point out the
4	misstatement by counsel. Here, we're under a
5	circumstance where there was mandatory consecutive
6	sentencing. This defendant is a second-time drug
7	offender, and Penal Law 70.20(2-a) requires that the
8	sentence be consecutive to if there is an
9	undischarged term of imprisonment.
10	JUDGE SMITH: Well, that's doesn't
11	that make it automatic?
12	MS. WOLFORD: It does make it automatic,
13	but it's important in what way it makes it automatic,
14	Your Honor. And what the court has to look at and
15	what the court focused on in Gill v. Greene is, under
16	New York sentencing laws, if a defendant is given
17	concurrent time now, that would be an illegal
18	sentence here, but if he was given concurrent time,
19	not only would he he'd get the twelve plus five
20	which was promised here, but he'd get credit for the
21	five years he did on his prior conviction, and in
22	essence getting seven years for his new crime, so
23	_
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not sure I understood
25	you, if I could interrupt for a minute.

1	MS. WOLFORD: Sure.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: The sentencing judge was not
3	aware that he was serving a parole violation
4	sentence?
5	MS. WOLFORD: There's no indication in the
6	record that he was aware.
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: And that's because parole
8	has its hearing and then it orders him reincarcerated
9	and the courts never touch it?
10	MS. WOLFORD: We don't even know if that
11	happened under the facts of this case.
12	JUDGE SMITH: Let me vary the
13	MS. WOLFORD: We have no idea what happened
14	with parole.
15	JUDGE SMITH: Sorry. Let me give you a
16	variation, a hypothetical. Suppose he had pleaded
17	guilty to two counts which called for mandatory and,
18	for some reason, consecutive sentencing was
19	mandatory. I don't know if that's ever true, but
20	let's say it is.
21	MS. WOLFORD: Okay.
22	JUDGE SMITH: Do they is that a
23	direct consequence? Do they have to advise him that
24	you're getting these two consecutive? Or even if
25	consecutive sentencing is a possibility, do you have

to warn him of that?

2	MS. WOLFORD: Yes. I mean, if it's part of
3	this plea proceeding and it's going to happen right
4	there in court, yes, you would have to be warned that
5	this is the agreement; you'd have to know what the
6	agreement was. In this case, he was told what the
7	agreement was. He was going to get twelve years. He
8	was going to get five years post-release supervision,
9	and there was a lot of discussion regarding its
10	effect on his federal
11	JUDGE SMITH: So you make a distinction in
12	the relationship between the two counts in the
13	hypothetical case, the two counts that are before
14	- both before the court
15	MS. WOLFORD: Right.
16	JUDGE SMITH: and the one count
17	that's before the court in the other one on which
18	he's serving an undischarged sentence.
19	MS. WOLFORD: Correct, because this court
20	has no control over what's happening with parole and,
21	quite frankly, has no knowledge of what's happening
22	with parole. It's the obligation and we go
23	back to where we were with, ultimately, Padilla where
24	the onus is on the defense attorney who knows the
25	most about this defendant's circumstance, not on the

1 court to inquire as to all possibilities. 2 In this particular case, if we established 3 a rule such as suggested by the defense at this point 4 that says every second-felony offender needs to be 5 told that this - - - that any sentence here is going 6 to run consecutively to an undischarged term of 7 imprisonment, it would mean nothing because then 8 every second-felony offender - - - we have second-9 felony offenders sentenced every single day in our 10 courts, and it would mean nothing. It would give them no additional information. 11 JUDGE SMITH: Well, the ones who were - - -12 13 the ones who didn't know they were looking at consecutive time would find it out. 14 15 MS. WOLFORD: Well, and - - - I'm sorry. 16 What? 17 JUDGE SMITH: The ones who were looking at 18 consecutive time and didn't know it would presumably 19 find that out when the judge told them. 20 MS. WOLFORD: Assuming that that means 21 anything to them, I guess, if - - -22 JUDGE READ: Well, I guess if you know you 23 have an undischarged portion of your sentence, it 2.4 would tell you something, right? 25 MS. WOLFORD: Well, and it's the People's

position that that information is in the hands of the 1 2 defense attorney, and it is their obligation to know 3 what their - - - situation of their client is. The 4 judge is in a different position. This judge on this 5 record had no indication. 6 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the judge has to determine if it's voluntary. 7 8 MS. WOLFORD: I'm sorry? 9 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The judge has to 10 determine if it's voluntary, right? 11 MS. WOLFORD: Right. 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So doesn't that place 13 a great responsibility on the judge? MS. WOLFORD: It does, and I think this 14 15 judge did a good job of going through and making sure 16 that - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but the whole 18 point of this case is, in this situation, is that 19 something that he must - - - that he or she, being 20 the judge, must make the defendant aware of at least 21 as to the possibility of that? MS. WOLFORD: If I could just take us back 22 23 to where - - - to Gill v. Greene for a second because 24 I think that that rule and the fact - - -25 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but this is the

1 plea; this is the plea where he's finding out - - -2 he, the defendant - - -3 MS. WOLFORD: Right. 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - is finding out 5 what awaits him and there's an issue as to - - - we want to make sure - - - the judge wants to make sure 6 7 that he's doing this with knowledge and that it's 8 voluntary. 9 MS. WOLFORD: Right. And this court has 10 said that that is only required as to the direct 11 consequences of the plea. 12 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but again I 13 come back to the question I asked you before and say 14 it again. How can anything be more direct than this 15 is? If it's immediate, automatic, how is it not 16 direct? 17 MS. WOLFORD: Well, direct means it 18 involves the sentence as being pronounced in the 19 courtroom that day, and that is what your case - - -20 your line of cases has - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But he's taking a 22 plea. 23 MS. WOLFORD: Correct. 2.4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And he wants to know 25 what he's pleaing to.

1	MS. WOLFORD: Right. And in all the cases,
2	we discuss this.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And it's the judge's
4	responsibility to tell him what he's pleaing to.
5	MS. WOLFORD: In every single case, Ford
6	and Gravino and Harnett, all of those cases are plea
7	cases where there is a significant consequence that
8	results after this plea takes place. And in this
9	case, it's the same it's the same thing. And
10	this court has said, repeatedly, that it's the core
11	components of the sentence that's being imposed.
12	It's the term of probation or the term of
13	imprisonment, the term of post-release supervision,
14	the fine, and it's limited it to that.
15	JUDGE READ: So you say you would say
16	we would be expanding Harnett?
17	MS. WOLFORD: Absolutely, absolutely. And
18	I would say to the court, exactly where does that
19	end, because we have a situation here where there was
20	discussion on the record about a federal sentence.
21	There was the defense attorney clearly had
22	discussed consecutive and concurrent time. I will
23	point out that the quote that is attributed to the
24	defense attorney
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does it end

1	doesn't it end with a direct consequence under state
2	law? Doesn't that
3	MS. WOLFORD: Well
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: make sense in
5	terms of a plea under state law?
6	MS. WOLFORD: only in the sense that
7	he got what he asked for, Your Honor, because if
8	- here, to give him to go back to this court's
9	language, he was never under the impression that he
10	should get that extra five years from his prior
11	sentence as time off on this one because we have to
12	talk about concurrent and consecutive time and the
13	reality of how it's calculated in New York. And he
14	never was promised seven years; he was promised
15	twelve plus five, and the only way to accomplish that
16	under New York law was to give him consecutive time.
17	Concurrent time would have given him from 2001 until
18	he was released to parole because concurrent time
19	requires that you give him time served for the prior
20	offense.
21	That when this court discussed the
22	fact that the court doesn't have to even pronounce
23	the fact that a sentence is consecutive in Gill v.
24	Greene, it went back to say that that exact
25	thing. The court I'm sorry. The court does
I	

1	not have to tell the defendant that he's not getting
2	a bargain he would have gotten by concurrent time.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
4	Thanks.
5	MS. WOLFORD: Thank you.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor.
7	MR. JUERGENS: Yes. If I may, three quick
8	points. Harnett doesn't get extended because we're
9	talking about punishment here.
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: Does it make any difference
11	that this is in the middle of a trial? I'm wondering
12	what the judge should do. You pick a jury, evidence
13	is being entered. It's not going well, apparently.
14	The defendant then decides to plead guilty and
15	I mean, do you then shut everything down and say,
16	well, let's get a pre-sentence investigation? I need
17	to know the facts of this federal thing so that we
18	can make sure that your client who is now stopping a
19	trial and wants to plead guilty to a much higher
20	- to more counts than he would have was offered
21	beforehand, that we now have to immediately declare a
22	mistrial and advise him of all that?
23	MR. JUERGENS: Well, there was no mistrial.
24	Basically, any time a defendant takes a plea, he's
25	going to look at a totality of the circumstances, and

this may have been a situation where there's a 1 2 tipping of the scales and he decided to enter the 3 guilty plea, but we cannot say that if he'd have been 4 advised that this was a mandatory twelve-year 5 consecutive sentence that that would not have tipped 6 the scales the other way - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right, but wouldn't - - -8 MR. JUERGENS: - - - and maybe hadn't 9 continued - - -10 JUDGE PIGOTT: I get - - - my point is, 11 where's the defense - - - and a very good defense 12 lawyer; I don't mean to pick on the defense lawyer. 13 But at some point, isn't that his job to say, you're 14 in the middle of a trial, pal, I mean we're going and 15 16 MR. JUERGENS: But - - -17 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - if you want to take a 18 plea, understand that these are the circumstances. Not the judge. I mean, the judge is - - -19 20 MR. JUERGENS: The judge just needs to warn 21 him if it's going to be mandatory consecutive. The 22 defense attorney can explain the circumstances and go over all the other - - - all the other factors that 23 24 may enter into his guilty plea. But what I would 25 like to point out - - -

1	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is parole required to
2	proceed on the revocation?
3	MR. JUERGENS: No. Parole, when they filed
4	it, they don't have to proceed. When they file their
5	
6	JUDGE GRAFFEO: But just ignore it and
7	_
8	MR. JUERGENS: Well, what happens is they
9	file
10	JUDGE GRAFFEO: presume and figure
11	that the next that he's pleaing to another
12	charge. In other words, we don't know what the
13	status of the parole violation was in this case, do
14	we?
15	MR. JUERGENS: And we don't need to know;
16	we don't need to know because our new sentence
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: So it's based but I
18	thought it's only if it's automatic. Now we're
19	talking about that maybe it's
20	MR. JUERGENS: He may end up
21	JUDGE GRAFFEO: it's only potentially
22	out there.
23	MR. JUERGENS: He may end up getting more
24	severe consequences depending on how parole proceeds,
25	but what happens when they file the parole detainer

1 is that that sentence stops. And you have a 2 situation where you're getting two sentences, and if 3 they're consecutive, you're going to aggregate them 4 and you're going to add them together. If they're 5 concurrent, you're going to merge - - -6 JUDGE PIGOTT: But that just - - - I mean, 7 I think the point being made here is parole can say 8 he's doing another dozen years on this one, we're not 9 doing anything; he's fine. 10 MR. JUERGENS: They can, but he still owes 11 four-and-a-half years. JUDGE PIGOTT: He can't, and Ms. Wolford's 12 13 point was we don't have the record. I mean, bring a 14 440 and put all this into motion papers, and maybe we 15 can - - -16 MR. JUERGENS: Well, we're attacking the 17 plea, and the plea is clear. We're talking about a 18 plea defect, and it's clear from the record of the 19 plea. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: Right. You just want to go 21 straight on, all times, this one - - -22 MR. JUERGENS: Well - - -23 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - he should have been 24 advised, period. 25 MR. JUERGENS: Well, the solution is that

all these cases involve predicate-felony offenders. 1 2 The DA is required to file a predicate-felony 3 offender - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: Ms. Wolford makes the 4 5 argument that we may be very, very busy if we do this. 6 MR. JUERGENS: Well, we'll make it simple. 7 8 Put in one line in the predicate-felony offender 9 statements where the defendant - - - this is a pre-10 sentencing proceeding. 11 JUDGE PIGOTT: But no, I mean the 440s that 12 are going to come after we find in your favor. 13 MR. JUERGENS: There shouldn't be any 440s 14 because - - -15 JUDGE PIGOTT: Why? They're all going to 16 say the same thing. 17 MR. JUERGENS: The 4 - - - this - - - it's 18 clear from the record, this is a direct appeal issue; 19 K2 issues are direct-appeal issues, and this is - -20 and this is - - -21 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know, but once you win that, then all of the people that are sitting in 22 23 Attica are going to say, geez - - -2.4 MR. JUERGENS: They haven't raised it on 25 direct appeal.

1 JUDGE PIGOTT: No. The 440 is going to 2 bring it up saying my lawyer was ineffective for not 3 raising the issue that Mr. Juergens argued so articulately in the Court of Appeals last time. 4 5 MR. JUERGENS: Well, rather than speak to 6 that, looking to the future, what I suggest is that 7 the prosecutors put in their second-felony offender statements one line where the defendant, while he's 8 9 admitting his predicate-felony conviction, says, I 10 also understand that this is going to be a 11 consecutive sentence under 70.25(2-a). Once you do 12 that, everyone's protected; the prosecutor, the 13 court, the defendant. JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't know. It doesn't 14 15 What does 70.25(2-a) mean? sound very clear to me. 16 MR. JUERGENS: Well, that's the mandatory 17 consec - - -18 JUDGE PIGOTT: I know that. I know that; 19 I'm a judge. 20 MR. JUERGENS: I'm sorry. 21 JUDGE PIGOTT: But I'm saying, what is the 22 guy who just got caught - - -23 MR. JUERGENS: Well, all - - -2.4 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - with the drugs in his 25 car?

1	MR. JUERGENS: All he needs to know is that
2	it's going to be a consecutive sentence. If he's
3	told that as a part of the second-felony offender
4	statement, then he can say to his attorney, what does
5	that mean?
б	JUDGE PIGOTT: Why doesn't his defense
7	lawyer tell him?
8	MR. JUERGENS: Well, apparently, neither
9	the defense attorney, the prosecutor or the judge
10	realized that, because they all reached a pre-trial
11	agreement that the new sentence was going to be
12	concurrent with the parole violation, and that's
13	illegal. And that's a common problem that we have in
14	these cases. And if that one line was put in the
15	second-felony offender statements, the that's
16	the point in time where the defendant has enough time
17	to say, wait a minute, what do you mean
18	consecutive/concurrent, and he can move to withdraw
19	his plea at that point.
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor.
21	Thanks.
22	Thank you both. Appreciate it.
23	(Court is adjourned)
24	
25	

CERTIFICATION
I, David Rutt, certify that the foregoing
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Troptor
Signature:
Agenau Nemet eCaribera
Agency Name: eScribers
Address of Agency: 700 West 192nd Street
Suite # 607
New York, NY 10040
New IOLK, NI 10040
Date: January 8, 2013
Date. Danuary 0, 2015