1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	Matter of:
5	M.G.M. INSULATION, INC.,
6	Appellant,
7	-against-
8	No. 4 COLLEEN GARDNER,
9	Respondent.
10	
11	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
12	January 2, 2013
13	Before:
14	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR.
16	
17	Appearances:
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25	Official Court Transcriber

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Number 4, Matter of
2	M.G.M. Insulation.
3	MR. ADAMS: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
4	Anthony Adams for the appellant contractors. And
5	Judge Lipmann, may I reserve two minutes for
6	rebuttal, please?
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Two minutes, sure.
8	Go ahead.
9	MR. ADAMS: Thank you.
10	Your Honors, if the commissioner had the
11	jurisdiction she claims here to extend prevailing
12	wage laws to functional equivalents of the public
13	entities that are listed in the statute, there would
14	have been no reason for the legislature to amend the
15	law in 2007 to extend it to contracts of entities
16	-
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the
18	service agree
19	MR. ADAMS: that are in place of
20	-
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the
22	service agreement here?
23	MR. ADAMS: The service agreement plainly
24	is for services
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Does that contemplate

1	that there would be labor laborers and
2	MR. ADAMS: Did not, Your Honor.
3	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: building a
4	firehouse? No?
5	MR. ADAMS: It did not; no, sir. The
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Why not? What does
7	it contemplate?
8	MR. ADAMS: What it contemplates in its
9	language is that the fire department will provide
10	fire services, fire prevention services, fire
11	and accidental types of services. That's all it
12	talks about. There's an annual fee. This is all per
13	statute.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There was no
15	contemplation of a building being built?
16	MR. ADAMS: No, there was not, Your Honor,
17	not in the contract. This is an annual service
18	contract which was simply for firefighting services
19	and ambulance services. It's the same contract every
20	year, just like the statute requires. Now, what did
21	happen
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But does
23	JUDGE GRAFFEO: They did increase it quite
24	a bit

MR. ADAMS: Now, what did happen - - - what

1 did happen is - - -2 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - though to cover - - -3 MR. ADAMS: - - - is one year - - -4 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - the debt load, the 5 anticipated debt load. 6 MR. ADAMS: That's right, Judge. In one 7 year, 2005 or 2006, the amount paid under the service 8 contract was increased by 150,000 dollars and at that 9 time - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So isn't that significant of something? 11 12 MR. ADAMS: Sure. They knew - - - they 13 knew that the occupancy costs of the fire department 14 were going to increase. The occupancy costs of a 15 fire department are part of the costs that they 16 recoup in their service agreement, same as Charter 17 School. 18 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Doesn't that 19 contemplate the building of a building which involves 20 work to get that building built? 21 MR. ADAMS: Contract doesn't contemplate 22 it, Your Honor. The contract - - - the fact that 23 people may have known about it, the fact that the 2.4 Village knew the occupancy - - - changing the

occupancy needs of the fire department doesn't change

1	the nature of the contract from a service contract.
2	That's all it was.
3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Do you know if this was the
4	first time that the Department of Labor imposed the
5	prevailing wage requirements on the construction of a
6	volunteer firehouse?
7	MR. ADAMS: I know it was not the first
8	time.
9	JUDGE GRAFFEO: I mean, there's hundreds of
10	them that are renovated and built around the
11	MR. ADAMS: That's right, Your Honor. And
12	what I know is that
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Are they all subject to
14	prevailing wage
15	MR. ADAMS: Depends what year, Your Honor;
16	it depends what year.
17	JUDGE GRAFFEO: or is the do we
18	have to look particularly at the financial
19	arrangements in this case?
20	MR. ADAMS: It depends what year you talk
21	about it because in my appendix I included three or
22	four opinions that have been issued over the years by
23	the Department about private fire corporation
24	buildings. In some years, they say they're exempt
25	because they aren't municipal corporations. And then

a few years go by, and they say, well, we changed our mind; they're really more - - - since they do get public funding, they're really more in the nature of a hybrid. And that goes for a few years, and then they change their mind again.

The letter in this case that found - - that counsel's office wrote that said, yeah, this is
a prevailing wage job - - - admitted in the letter
itself we're reversing what we've written and the
policy we've been following in our past letters.

JUDGE PIGOTT: You did - - - did you - - - is there something in this record about you are indemnifying or holding harmless the contractors?

MR. ADAMS: There is, Your Honor. The volunteer fire company - - - once the Department of Labor came to the site and told people you're going to have to pay prevailing wages, the contractors stopped working. And at that point, the volunteer fire department issued a letter to the contractor that said, we'll indemnify you in the event that you are found responsible.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, this has - - - this section has criminal penalties.

MR. ADAMS: It does; that's right, Your Honor.

JUDGE PIGOTT: You can - - - so, I mean, 1 2 under our jurisprudence, I think that means we 3 strictly construe it, and you can indemnify them for whatever the fine is, but don't they then face 4 5 disqualification for up to five years or - - -MR. ADAMS: They face - - - not only they 6 face interest at sixteen percent. They face a 7 8 penalty of twenty-five percent. They face potential 9 disbarment from future public work. In extreme 10 cases, they face potential criminal conduct. 11 But if I may, Your Honor, I don't think the 12 indemnity agreement really affects the issue here. 13 The question is really whether the commissioner has 14 the authority to go beyond - - - to extend this law 15 beyond the four entities that are very clearly 16 spelled out. 17 JUDGE PIGOTT: I raised it because I don't 18 think it covers everything and - - -19 MR. ADAMS: It does not; I agree. 20 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - to get back to my - -21 - my point is that when we have a criminal statute or 22 a statute that has criminal sanctions, we usually 23 construe them very strictly because you've got to let 2.4 people know that they may be subject to criminal

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penalties here.

1 MR. ADAMS: Well, that's right, Your Honor. 2 Not only that, but this court has said on more than 3 one occasion that when defining what the meaning of 4 public work is, under Labor Law 220, it's to be 5 construed strictly under a strict legal sense. Now, I know the other - - -6 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, there's two prongs, 7 8 right, whether - - -9 MR. ADAMS: Yes, there are. 10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - it's a public entity 11 and whether it's a public contract. MR. ADAMS: That's right, Your Honor. 12 13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Under the public entity 14 prong, what are the factors that you suggest we 15 should examine here to determine if - - -16 MR. ADAMS: The statute, Your Honor - - -17 the Section Labor Law 220 which says that it only 18 applies to contracts of a municipal corporation, the 19 state, a public-benefit corporation or a commission 20 appointed pursuant to law. That's what the statute 21 says. Now - - -22 JUDGE READ: But you say it's restricted to 23 four categories. 2.4 MR. ADAMS: That's right, Your Honor.

That's what it is; it's surely what that says.

1	JUDGE SMITH: Would the amendment change
2	the result here if it applied?
3	MR. ADAMS: It might, Your Honor; I'm not
4	certain.
5	JUDGE GRAFFEO: It would make it a closer -
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7	MR. ADAMS: It would make it a closer case.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Certainly would.
9	MR. ADAMS: The reason I'm not certain is
10	it didn't make a difference in the Charter Schools
11	case which is also a closed case.
12	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But, again, I come
13	back to the question I asked you originally, which I
14	think was the issue in the Charter School case, too.
15	Was the agreement in contemplation of, you know,
16	workers working on this kind of a building as opposed
17	to you could find that in the Charter School
18	case there wasn't that contemplation in the charter
19	as opposed to this case with this agreement, right?
20	One could argue that.
21	MR. ADAMS: Your Honor, I don't think so.
22	There's more in the charter
23	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, why not?
24	MR. ADAMS: Because there's more language

in the charter - - - what you're looking at in the

1 Charter Schools case, that charter actually described 2 the physical premises in which the school was going 3 to operate, at least. If you look at these service 4 contracts, and they haven't changed in substance, the 5 service contracts specifically say, in consideration 6 of the fire department providing firefighting 7 services and emergency services - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah, but again - - -9 MR. ADAMS: - - - we're going to pay you a 10 lump sum. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But going back to the 12 point that Judge Graffeo made before, but there was 13 an increase in the - - -14 MR. ADAMS: In the service charge. 15 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: That could only be 16 attributable to one thing, right? 17 MR. ADAMS: Well, they did it because they 18 knew that the occupancy costs of the fire department 19 were going to increase. There's no question that 20 that money was increased to help the fire department 21 fund its move - - - or fund its future occupancy 22 costs. 23 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did they get funding from 2.4 any other sources?

MR. ADAMS: Oh, yes, Your Honor.

borrowed the money themselves. They got a permanent loan.

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JUDGE GRAFFEO: Did they own the land or they had to buy the land?

MR. ADAMS: They purchased the land from private company - - - from private - - - here's what happened. They went out - - - they had a little bit of money that they had saved from fundraising. They went out and they got a 2.1-million-dollar loan from the United States Agriculture Department, USDA. They - - - that was only payable upon substantial completion. So then they went out to the local bank and they got three separate loans from the local bank - - one to fund the purchase of the lots, which they did themselves, and then later to fund the progress payments to the contractors. They were the only ones on those obligations.

Then when the project was substantially complete, the funding came in from the federal government on the loan that the fire department had acquired, and that was used to pay back the bank. The fire department is the only entity that was on the hook for any of the loans, any of the deeds, any of the other obligations in this record.

1	Now, to the extent that there are minutes -
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3	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Well, what was the total
4	cost of the project? Do we know? Was that in the
5	record?
6	MR. ADAMS: It's about 2.5 million dollars,
7	Your Honor.
8	JUDGE GRAFFEO: And how much of that came
9	from the Village?
10	MR. ADAMS: None of it; none of it. What
11	we're talking about from the Village is increasing
12	the annual fee.
13	JUDGE GRAFFEO: Only the debt service was
14	paid from the
15	MR. ADAMS: Well
16	JUDGE GRAFFEO: monies received from
17	the Village?
18	MR. ADAMS: the Village didn't
19	technically pay the debt service. The Village
20	increased the service fee each year in part to help
21	the district be able to fund its own debt service on
22	its own loans.
23	JUDGE READ: Well, the debt service was
24	what, slightly more? The debt service was like 158
25	or 156 or

1 MR. ADAMS: That's right, Your Honor. 2 JUDGE READ: - - - 150. 3 Before your time entirely expires, Judge 4 Graffeo asked you about the two prongs - - -5 MR. ADAMS: Yes. JUDGE READ: - - - the public entity and 6 7 public work. Now, what's your position on the public work? Is this public work? 8 9 MR. ADAMS: Not a public work, Your Honor. 10 I think this court's precedent is pretty clear that 11 it's the use to which - - - it is the - - - a public 12 work is if it's a - - - if a work is going to be 13 built for public use and access. The fact that this 14 may be used for a public purpose is not the same 15 thing. Public use and access. The public is not 16 going to have use of this building. 17 JUDGE SMITH: Are you saying that even if 18 the Village builds a firehouse it's not a public 19 work, even if the Village itself builds it? 20 MR. ADAMS: If the Village itself builds 21 it, I'm not sure if there are different things that 22 go into play on that point, Your Honor. But I would 23 say that in this case it's not because a private - -2.4 - probably if the Village builds it, maybe it is

because the Village is a public entity and

1	traditionally its citizens have access to it. This
2	is a private entity that built this. The citizens
3	don't have access to this firehouse.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Do you think there'd
5	be a difference in the access between if the city had
6	built it and what happened here?
7	MR. ADAMS: For sure there could be, Your
8	Honor. And here's a great example
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is there in practice?
10	MR. ADAMS: There's a great example here.
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is there in practice,
12	counsel?
13	MR. ADAMS: In practice, well, I don't
14	know, Your Honor.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There's not a logical
16	distinction between them.
17	MR. ADAMS: I don't know. All I can tell
18	you is in
19	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I'm asking you the
20	question.
21	MR. ADAMS: Well
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: There's not a logical
23	distinction between the two, between the Village as
24	an entity?
25	MR. ADAMS: I'm not sure about that, Your

1 Honor. To the extent there's an area of the building 2 that's used for fundraising and that kind of - - - or 3 a common area, that was something - - - in the hands 4 of a village, they may have to make that available to 5 everybody; I don't know. In the hands of this private fire corporation, they leased it out to 6 7 people on a - - - who are willing to pay the rate and 8 -- - for their community room, and that was -- -9 and they could be free to turn somebody away. I'm 10 not sure a village would be. 11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Counselor, you 12 have your rebuttal time. Let's hear from your 13 adversary. 14

MR. ADAMS: Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thanks, counselor.

Counselor.

MS. CHAUDHRY: May it please the Court, Zainab Chaudhry for the commissioner.

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Your Honors, although this - - - a court can affirm for any one of three reasons. Let me start with the simplest, which is that the fire department is a department of the Village, as a matter of law, under the governing statutes; both the Village law and the not-for-profit corporation.

JUDGE SMITH: That argument would apply to

1 every volunteer fire company in the state. 2 MS. CHAUDHRY: Correct, correct, Your 3 And for example, the Village law, all fire -Honor. 4 5 JUDGE SMITH: It is the position of the 6 state, then, that all volunteer fire companies have 7 to pay prevailing wage on these projects? MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, Your Honor - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: Or their contractors do? 10 MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, yes, Your Honor. 11 not-for-profit corporation law expressly provides 12 that these fire departments are under the control and 13 authority of the municipalities having, by law, 14 control over the prevention or extinguishment of 15 fires therein. The Village law here - - -16 JUDGE SMITH: But they're also defined as 17 something called a fire corporation. Is that the 18 Fire corporation? name? 19 MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, a fire corporation. 20 JUDGE SMITH: And they're not one of the 21 four categories listed in 220. MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, Your Honor, they are 22 23 one of the categories in the sense that they are a 2.4 department of the Village, just a - - - which is a 25 municipal corporation which is listed in the statute.

1 JUDGE SMITH: But they are a distinct 2 corporation; they're a fire corporation. 3 MS. CHAUDHRY: They're distinct in that they are incorporated under not-for-profit 4 5 corporation law, but the - - -6 JUDGE PIGOTT: Do they get - - -7 MS. CHAUDHRY: - - - but the - - -8 JUDGE PIGOTT: They don't get a public 9 pension; they don't get workers comp. They don't get 10 anything from the Village, in this case, which is why 11 they're not-for-profit, and they go do whatever they 12 do. And they're a great benefit to the Village 13 because they don't have to pay them other than under this contract. They don't have to worry about them 14 15 sliding down poles, for example. 16 MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, certainly, Your Honor, 17 they are actually entitled - - - fire corporations under 1402 and their members are entitled to several 18 19 of the same benefits and immunities that other fire 20 companies are, same indemnification, immunities, the 21 benefits of the volunteer firefighter benefit law. 22 And if - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: Do they get to choose -- they 2.4 get to choose their own leaders, don't they?

ordinary city fire department can't choose its own

commissioner.

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MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, they do elect their officers; however, the membership and the officers are subject to approval by the municipal authorities under the Village law, the town law, whatever the municipality - - -

JUDGE SMITH: They can do things that the city wants them not to do. In fact, they did in this case. They went out and pursued a fire - - - a firehouse project that the Village was originally against.

MS. CHAUDHRY: It's true that there was some reluctance initially on the part of the Village for the project going forward, but the facts bear out that the Village thereafter was extensively involved.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Before we get into that

functional equivalent which got me to the fact that

this is a criminal statute - - - it has criminal

sanctions, and we try to strictly construe that

because wouldn't it be a logical conclusion of this

that - - if you were to prevail, that these

contractors who then did this work and did not pay

prevailing wages can be debarred from - - - for five

years - - I think it's five years from any public

works projects in the State of New York?

MS. CHAUDHRY: Criminal sanctions are available, Your Honor, but there aren't any here, and the prevailing wage - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I don't know. I mean, there could be. I mean, you could go tomorrow. But my - - and the more important question is that I'm not sure you can hire somebody who has been found violating the prevailing wage law if you're another public entity. So these five - - I think it's five - - contractors would be out of luck for five years.

MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, Your Honor. But there's no evidence in the record that there's been any criminal sanctions here, and in fact, the other side of this is that the - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, you're missing my point; you're missing my point. I mean, we're going to make a decision that's going to say to every - - - I guess, what you want to say - - every volunteer fire department in the State of New York, if you do something that requires a prevailing wage, your contractors are subject to criminal sanctions; they can be debarred from contracts within the State of New York for public works contracts for five years, so just be careful when you do this. Regardless of

what happens, it's too bad.

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MS. CHAUDHRY: I understand your concern,
Honor. Except here - - - Your Honor, except here,
there's nothing of that - - - there's nothing harsh
about it because they knew at the time of the
contract that the prevailing wage law question was an
issue counsel's opinion letter had issued. In fact,
once they were aware of the issue, they, in fact,
engaged in conduct precisely to avoid the application
of the prevailing wage law.

JUDGE PIGOTT: So you do want to sanction them?

MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, the commissioner has not taken a position on whether or not they're going to be sanctioned. I think the question is are they, as a matter of law, a Village department. But alternatively, if the court is reluctant to say that all fire corporations constitute a village department, as the Appellant Division found here alternatively, the facts here do bear out those legal relationships and establish that, in fact, it was actually operating under the Village's control both generally and with respect to the project.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the significance of the service contract?

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MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, that provides a third alternative basis to satisfy the first prong of the test. The agreement need not be a construction contract per se. And unlike the situation that we had in Charter Schools where, yes, the court rejected that argument - - -

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's the difference between those two?

MS. CHAUDHRY: The difference is that here the contract - - - the service contract is more closely related to the actual construction.

JUDGE PIGOTT: If the same people say our ambulance is an antique, we're going to buy a new one, is that the functional equivalent of a government? Do they have to worry about buying a new ambulance because they decide to do it and it's going to service the - - -

MS. CHAUDHRY: No, Your Honor. The point here is that volunteer fire corporations, they have a unique status under the law. It's a historical anomaly. They have been nominally independent since the beginning of this nation's history, but later on, the legislature had decided to incorporate them within the municipal government structure.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What's your best

1 argument among those three arguments? 2 MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, all the 3 arguments are strong. You certainly - - - the 4 broadest argument and the most compelling and 5 actually the simplest is that they are, as a matter 6 of law, departments - - -7 JUDGE PIGOTT: So you think the - - -8 MS. CHAUDHRY: - - - under the government. 9 JUDGE PIGOTT: - - - hearing officer was 10 wrong; they're not the functional equivalent of 11 government; they are, in fact, government? MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, the hearing officer 12 13 used the term "functional equivalent", but I think if 14 the commissioner's determination is carefully read, 15 it really relied upon the governing statutes, the 16 Village law, the not-for-profit corporation law. 17 JUDGE READ: So what if they decide they want to build - - - have somebody build a barbecue 18 19 pit for their chicken roasts? 20 MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, Your Honor - - -21 JUDGE READ: That's covered by prevailing 22 wage? 23 MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, Your Honor, that gets 2.4 into the second prong of the test, whether or not 25 it's a public work. And with regard to - - -

1 JUDGE SMITH: Before you go to public work, 2 I'm sorry, you had three arguments. I think I'm 3 missing the second one. What's in between the first and the third? 4 5 MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes. The first is under the 6 governing statute as a matter of law - - -7 JUDGE SMITH: I understand the first and I understand the third. What's the second? 8 9 MS. CHAUDHRY: Okay. The second one is 10 that as the Appellant Division held on the facts here that the fire department was, in fact, operating as a 11 12 Village department under the Village's actual 13 control. 14 JUDGE SMITH: That this particular project 15 was a Village project even though the fire department 16 would might - - - could theoretically not be part of 17 the Village? 18 MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, the project, yes, and 19 also that it was acting as a department generally. For fifty years, it operated out of a Village-owned 20 21 firehouse. It was - - - the Village owned and 22 financed the large trucks, paid for the fuel, the 23 gas, electric, sewer, training, physicals. 2.4 JUDGE READ: Is that unusual?

MS. CHAUDHRY: I don't believe that is

unusual, Your Honor. And I think the Appellant Division may have thought it was answering this on a narrower ground, but really the reality is that you may never have a situation where the fire department is not active anymore. JUDGE SMITH: So in your view, the Appellate Division decision essentially stands for the proposition that volunteer fire companies are

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fire companies are subject to prevailing wage law?

MS. CHAUDHRY: I don't think it expressly said that, Your Honor, although it did recognize the importance of the statutes in coming to its conclusion but, perhaps concerned about making a broad ruling, tried to keep it more narrowly tailored

subject - - - construction contracts by volunteer

JUDGE PIGOTT: Does it make any difference that they - - - that the volunteer fire department owns the land?

to the facts here which are extensive.

MS. CHAUDHRY: No, Your Honor, it doesn't make a difference.

JUDGE PIGOTT: So this building that's going to be on their land is a government building?

MS. CHAUDHRY: Well, Your Honor, it's owned in the name of the corporation - - - of the not-for-

1 profit corporation, but it is a Village project here, 2 and the Village - - - the service contract agreement 3 enhanced the annual payments by nearly an amount that 4 matched the loan repayment. 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But that's the 6 narrowest ground that we could uphold your position, 7 right? 8 MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, Your Honor, if you want 9 to look at just the service agreement, but - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: We didn't want to 11 make any broad pronouncements. 12 MS. CHAUDHRY: Right. 13 JUDGE GRAFFEO: If the fire department defaulted on the bank loans, is the Village 14 15 responsible? Do the Village taxpayers have to pay 16 off those loans? 17 MS. CHAUDHRY: I think the status of the 18 fire department as a corporate entity is relevant as 19 a borrower, and I don't think the Village would have 2.0 been on the hook for that; it was not a cosigner to 21 those loans. But that doesn't speak to whether it's 22 a Village department for prevailing wage law 23 purposes. And I just want to emphasize here that 2.4 this is not an expansion of the commissioner's - - -

JUDGE GRAFFEO: See, I'm trying to figure

1 out where we come up with that a Village department 2 is enough because the statute has four specific 3 categories, so it has to be - - - I guess you're trying to shoehorn it into municipal corporation? 4 Is 5 that what we're trying to do? MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, just the way that a 6 7 state and all its departments are subject to the 8 prevailing wage law, a municipal corporation and all 9 of its departments - - - highway department or 10 whatever other department, would be subject to the 11 prevailing wage law. CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: And what's the 12 13 difference between this case and the Charter School 14 case? 15 MS. CHAUDHRY: Your Honor, this case is 16 very different from the Charter Schools case. That 17 decision was narrowly crafted. The Court looked at 18 specific characteristics of the Charter Schools, none 19 of which are present with respect to fire

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is it because that one wasn't in contemplation of the work being performed and this one is?

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corporations.

MS. CHAUDHRY: That's with respect to the service contract.

1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: To the service
2	yeah.
3	MS. CHAUDHRY: The service contract, yes.
4	But even more generally, fire corporations do not
5	possess the same characteristics as charter schools.
6	They are while charter schools have substantial
7	autonomy and were created that way, fire corporations
8	are expressly subject to the municipality.
9	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, that goes back
10	to the line of questioning that Judge Graffeo was
11	asking. You're saying that in reality it is, under
12	the law, a public
13	MS. CHAUDHRY: Yes, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: a public
15	institution?
16	MS. CHAUDHRY: Under the existing law, the
17	commissioner's determination is grounded in that law
18	where municipal corporations and their departments
19	are already subject to the prevailing wage law, and
20	this is based on the unique statutory scheme
21	governing fire corporations. It would not broadly
22	apply to any other entity out there. And that would
23	be the simplest way upon which the court could
24	affirm.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks,

counselor.

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Counselor, rebuttal.

MR. ADAMS: Briefly, Your Honor.

Judge Lippman, first of all, as far as the difference between charter schools and fire departments - - - fire corporations, I refer the court to my brief, pages 19 through 21; the differences are not material.

With respect to the service contract claim, this was specifically waived in the Appellant

Division. In their brief they said to the Appellate

Division, we are - - - that in light of this - - 
when they went to the Appellant Division, the Third

Department had ruled that - - - on the Charter

Schools case. And what they wrote in their brief

down below in here was in light of the Charter

Schools decision at the Appellate Division, we no

longer rely on the service agreement argument. They

took that right out of their brief, so they can't

argue it here.

JUDGE SMITH: Aren't they allowed to make arguments here that they didn't make there?

MR. ADAMS: Not if they waived them.

Specifically, if they overlooked them, sure, Your

Honor, but I don't think they're entitled to if they

specifically waived them. I mean, what are we supposed to brief? If issues that are waived by counsel, expressly waived, can be resurrected later, what does that - - - does that mean we have to brief everything that's conceivable in the next appeal to any appellate court? Doesn't make sense.

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Judge Smith, to clarify something you asked, the Appellate Division specifically ruled only that the Bath Volunteer Fire Department is in this partic - - on this record a functional equivalent. But that's not what the commissioner said. The commissioner said all volunteer fire corporations are functional equivalents. So the Appellate Division ruled on a ground that the commissioner did not.

Lastly, this department of a village thing is limited by the statute to Village law, Article 10. Other provisions of the law say that they must be contracted with separately, that they must be paid separately, that they will own their own property. When the legislature has wanted to include volunteer fire companies, fire corporations in public procurement laws, they've done it and they know how to do it.

Under municipal law, Article 5(a), on public contracts, specifically has sections that say

1	that not only municipal corporations but volunteer
2	fire companies have certain rights and obligations
3	under the public contracting laws. And when they
4	meant them, they said them. Here they didn't say
5	them. They didn't say fire corporations; they didn't
6	say not-for-profit corporations.
7	That's all, Your Honor.
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thanks,
9	counselors. Thank you both.
10	(Court is adjourned)
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## CERTIFICATION

I, David Rutt, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Matter of M.G.M. Insulation, Inc. v. Colleen Gardner,

No. 4 was prepared using the required transcription

equipment and is a true and accurate record of the

proceedings.



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Date: January 3, 2013