1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PAPPAS,
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	No. 193 TZOLIS,
8	Appellant.
9	
10	27 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10010 October 11, 2012
11	Before:
12	
13	CHIEF JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CARMEN BEAUCHAMP CIPARICK
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE VICTORIA A. GRAFFEO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSAN PHILLIPS READ
15	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROBERT S. SMITH ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR. ASSOCIATE JUDGE THEODORE T. JONES
16	Appearances:
17	
18	E. LEO MILONAS, ESQ.
19	PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN, LLP Attorneys for Appellant
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24	
25	David Rutt Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: 193, Pappas. 2 MR. MILONAS: Good morning. My name is Leo 3 Milonas. I'm the attorney for the appellant, Pappas - - Tzolis. 4 5 There's no significant difference between this case and this case (sic) recent decision of 6 7 Centro Empresarial. Under Centro, sophisticated parties could release fiduciary duties. In our case, 8 9 instead a general release, the parties executed a 10 specific agreement where they relinquished their 11 fiduciary duties. 12 JUDGE READ: You're talking about the 13 certificate? MR. MILONAS: I'm talking about the 14 15 certificate. JUDGE GRAFFEO: Can I ask you, does the 16 17 record tell us at the time the certificates were executed if the other party's counsel was present? 18 19 MR. MILONAS: Counsel was present. 2.0 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Everyone's attorneys were 21 there? 22 MR. MILONAS: That - - - you can see that from the complaint and the affidavit that was 23 2.4 submitted. Everyone had their own counsel. Counsel 25 were present. Counsel handwrote the - - -

1	JUDGE SMITH: But do we know whose
2	handwriting that is?
3	MR. MILONAS: I know.
4	JUDGE SMITH: Or does the record show?
5	MR. MILONAS: Yeah. I think it was written
6	by Tzolis' counsel excuse me by Pappas'
7	counsel dictated by Tzolis' counsel. So it was
8	dictated by the defendant's counsel, but I think it
9	was handwritten by one of the
LO	JUDGE SMITH: Is there any there's
L1	nothing in the record really that tells the story, or
L2	is there, of how that came into existence with the -
L3	well, usually these things aren't handwritten.
L4	MR. MILONAS: Well
L5	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, let me
L6	-
L7	MR. MILONAS: something happened.
L8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Let me break your
L9	reasoning for a second. Do you want any rebuttal
20	time?
21	MR. MILONAS: Yeah, five minutes, please.
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Five minutes. Okay.
23	Go ahead. Continue. I'm sorry.
24	MR. MILONAS: Something happened
25	apparently and this was executed at the as you

1 can see, it's handwritten after the printed document. 2 JUDGE SMITH: Does it matter to this case, 3 in your view, that your client already had a sublease 4 on the building? 5 MR. MILONAS: Oh, I think it matters considerably. The reason is that it establishes what 6 7 is the real relationship with the parties. First of 8 all, under the original agreement, the parties are 9 each able to actually do business on their own 10 account, compete with the LLC. They have - - - they 11 could do - - - engage in any business without any 12 obligation - - -13 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but my question - - -14 MR. MILONAS: - - - at any time. 15 JUDGE SMITH: - - - is about the sublease. 16 MR. MILONAS: But in the same originating 17 agreement, in paragraph 4, Tzolis is given a right to 18 sublease. So the whole agreement is set up with the 19 concept that they can engage in their own businesses. 20 Tzolis is going to get a sublease. 21 JUDGE SMITH: I guess the - - - maybe I 22 should be asking your adversary this, but the - - -23 as I understand it, and I may be confused, the 2.4 sublease essentially, even before - - - even before

the deal that they're complaining about, the sublease

1 had given essentially all the upside to your client. 2 Isn't that - - - doesn't that - - - isn't that what 3 it does? 4 MR. MILONAS: It gave them all the 5 obligations under the lease, which means putting up -6 7 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah, but it was a fixed 8 obligation, and if, I mean - - - I guess what I'm 9 saying is this. Suppose you went to his client - - -10 your guy went to his guys and said, I want to buy you 11 out, and they said, no, forget it. Can't he go back 12 to Extell and say, I'm sorry I can't get you the 13 lease, but I'll assign you my sublease; instead of 14 seventeen million, give me sixteen million? 15 MR. MILONAS: No. There were two things -16 - - the reason I think we have the closing is that 17 there are two parts of the sublease that were an 18 obstacle. There was a one-day reverter at the end of 19 the sublease that was forty-nine - - - eight years, 20 eleven months, about one day left, and there was a 21 prevision that the - - - all the parties had to agree 22 - - rather the plaintiffs had to agree to a

JUDGE SMITH: So they were not free to assign without the landlord's consent?

sublease if Tzolis was going to sublease.

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1 MR. MILONAS: That's what it says. 2 whether that could be unreasonably held is another 3 issue. But yes, they needed the consent, and there 4 was a one-day reverter. So there was a reason to buy 5 it out. 6 JUDGE GRAFFEO: In your view, what's the 7 extent of the fiduciary duty for limited partners, and did they waive it here? Is that - - -8 9 MR. MILONAS: In our case? 10 JUDGE GRAFFEO: Is that your argument? 11 MR. MILONAS: There's no question that they waived it. First of all, the - - - Justice Gammerman 12 13 believed and he wrote that they waived it in the 14 original certificate, in the originating certificate 15 of the LLC. Because if you can engage in - - -16 JUDGE GRAFFEO: If they - - -17 MR. MILONAS: - - - any business you want -18 19 JUDGE GRAFFEO: If that language wasn't 20 there, would there have been a fiduciary duty here? 21 I guess that's my question. 22 MR. MILONAS: Oh, sure. 23 JUDGE GRAFFEO: What in general would have 2.4 been the fiduciary duty between - - -25 MR. MILONAS: I think there would have been

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1
          until they signed - - -
 2
                    JUDGE GRAFFEO: - - - limited liability
 3
          partners.
                    MR. MILONAS: - - - until they signed the
 4
 5
          certificate. The certificate - - -
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the - - -
 6
 7
                    MR. MILONAS: - - - eliminated it.
                    JUDGE READ: There would have been what?
 8
 9
          Disclosure?
10
                    MR. MILONAS: Excuse me?
11
                    JUDGE READ: There would have been a duty
          of disclosure until the certificate was signed?
12
13
                    MR. MILONAS: If there was, the certificate
          waived it and - - -
14
15
                    JUDGE READ: Yeah. You don't - - -
16
                    MR. MILONAS: - - - relinquished it.
17
                    JUDGE READ: You don't think there was a
          duty to disclose under the operating agreement?
18
19
                    MR. MILONAS: Under the operating
2.0
          agreement? Yes, I think there was.
21
                    JUDGE READ: Okay.
22
                    CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What about the - - -
23
          is there particular knowledge within your client's,
2.4
          you know, experience that the value of the property
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that doesn't - - - wasn't known to the other party,

that changes that whole idea that they waived? 1 2 you have been knowledge that it's particularly within 3 your client's - - - you know, how does that change 4 what appears - - - what might appear to be a waiver? 5 MR. MILONAS: That's what you call the special facts doctrine, I believe. And the 6 7 respondent has waived that on this appeal. They say 8 the special facts doctrine doesn't apply. 9 assuming it does apply, as it did in Centro 10 Empresarial - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Yeah. 12 MR. MILONAS: - - - at a minimum you have a 13 closing. You're getting a million and a half 14 dollars. You put up 75,000 dollars. Query: do you 15 ask a question? Don't you have a minimal obligation to inquire what's going on, why you're giving me a 16 17 million and a half dollars? CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Well, what if they 18 19 had no reason to believe that your client was trying 20 to pull the wool over their eyes? 21 MR. MILONAS: Well, I'm not sure it's 22 characterized that way. 23 JUDGE CIPARICK: I mean, the complaint - -2.4

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, but, you know

1 what I'm saying. They had no reason to believe - - -2 to distrust your client. Let's put it that way. 3 MR. MILONAS: I mean, first of all, they 4 can't go to a deal like that. The special facts 5 doctrine - - -6 JUDGE SMITH: They sure had reason to 7 believe - - -JUDGE CIPARICK: Well, the complaint - - -8 9 JUDGE SMITH: - - - it was worth a million 10 bucks to your client - - - I'm sorry. 11 MR. MILONAS: Excuse me? 12 JUDGE CIPARICK: The complaint makes 13 certain allegations. In the complaint, there's an 14 indication that the - - - they weren't able to 15 develop the property the way they thought they would, 16 that your client was interfering with that, et 17 cetera. So they were on notice that there were 18 issues. MR. MILONAS: Well, that's another part of 19 20 this case. You can't say that this was a loving 21 relationship. 22 JUDGE CIPARICK: Right. 23 MR. MILONAS: This was an arm's-length 2.4 business deal.

JUDGE CIPARICK: Between two sophisticated

1 2 MR. MILONAS: They were, from the get-go -3 4 JUDGE CIPARICK: - - - and well - - - and 5 counseled parties. 6 MR. MILONAS: From the get-go, I'm not they 7 were fiduciaries or what they were. I mean - - -8 JUDGE SMITH: But going back to the point 9 about what - - - well, what reason the sellers -- the 10 assignors had to believe - - - your client offered 11 them what? A million bucks? MR. MILONAS: Million and a half. 12 13 JUDGE SMITH: Million and a half. MR. MILONAS: One third - - -14 15 JUDGE SMITH: They obviously had reason to 16 believe that he had - - - that he could make at least 17 a million-six on what we - - - that he thought he was worth more than a million and a half. 18 19 MR. MILONAS: Certainly, but - - -20 JUDGE SMITH: Yeah. So I mean, I guess - -21 - so your point is they could have said, hey, I'll do 22 it but not if you've got some great deal out there; 23 tell me what you've got. 2.4 MR. MILONAS: Yeah, exactly.

JUDGE GRAFFEO: There's no duty do disclose

	before you secure that kind of waiver?
2	MR. MILONAS: The courts the cases
3	don't hold that. You the judge and the
4	judges in the Appellant Division said that up to the
5	moment it was signed they the fiduciary
6	obligation existed, and then the moment it was
7	signed, going forward, there was a fiduciary
8	their fiduciary obligation was ended. Well, it's
9	really illogical, if you think about it.
10	JUDGE CIPARICK: So there's no distinction
11	here between this case and Centro?
12	MR. MILONAS: I think there's no difference
13	at all.
14	JUDGE CIPARICK: What about Arfa?
15	MR. MILONAS: I think Arfa is it
16	follows Centro.
17	JUDGE CIPARICK: Um-hum
18	MR. MILONAS: Arfa is also seems to
19	be similar to Centro, and I don't I'm not sure
20	there's a difference
21	JUDGE SMITH: Suppose let's take all
22	the complexity
23	MR. MILONAS: at least in principal
24	anyway.
25	JUDGE SMITH: take all the

1	complexities out of this case and make it the
2	simplest thing in the world, just a good old-
3	fashioned partnership. The LLC owns the building.
4	There are three partners. One of them gets an
5	hears that somebody's going to buy the building for a
6	huge price, goes to his partners, doesn't tell them,
7	says I want to buy you out. That's a breach, isn't
8	it?
9	MR. MILONAS: First of all, this was not a
10	good old-fashioned
11	JUDGE SMITH: I understand that I've not
12	described our case.
13	MR. MILONAS: This is by far not a good
14	old-fashioned partnership.
15	If you sign a document and you say that
16	you've made no representations to me
17	JUDGE SMITH: No. I mean, let me
18	MR. MILONAS: It depends.
19	JUDGE SMITH: Can you first address the
20	pure hypothetical question that I asked
21	MR. MILONAS: Yes. The answer is yes.
22	JUDGE SMITH: that that's a breach of
23	fiduciary duty. Okay.
24	MR. MILONAS: That's a fiduciary duty. If
25	you're partners and you're holding back and

definitely, that's the breach; but not under the facts of this case. You got everything - - - people should be free to enter into agreements as they wish. As long as they don't violate public policy, they should be free to do that.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But in Centro, they knew that they were not forthright, right? I mean, is there a difference in the facts here? Centro is clearer that they knew that - - -

MR. MILONAS: I'm not sure, but yes, Centro they may have known. But in this case they had been - - - they were fighting from the beginning. They were arguing about different things. The - - - Tzolis already had the premises under a sublease, and he was trying to develop it for his own account. Under the LLC, they could develop business on their own account. They could compete with the LLC, And they finally execute a document which says basically as is, where is, this is the deal, we waive everything, we waive fiduciary duties, and you've made no representations to us. I mean, it's very - - this is even stronger than Centro.

CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay, counselor. You'll have your rebuttal.

MR. MILONAS: Thank you.

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1	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor.
2	MR. PERSON: May it please the Court. Carl
3	Person is my name.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, what's the
5	difference between this case and Centro?
6	MR. PERSON: Well
7	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is there a
8	difference?
9	MR. PERSON: Yes. We have people not
10	putting in any money of their own and selling the
11	partnership's asset. I mean, that's not competing
12	with a company. That's, I think
13	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You there were
14	disputes between the parties, right?
15	MR. PERSON: Only business disputes, not
16	honesty, not a question of
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: You have a trust
18	relationship with the other side?
19	MR. PERSON: I'm sorry?
20	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Did you have a trust
21	relationship?
22	MR. PERSON: I believe there was.
23	Otherwise, there would have been a different result
24	here. I mean, the they went into the
25	transaction. Mr. Tzolis wanted to take this property

1 and develop a restaurant or a delicatessen or something like that, and you know, there - - -2 3 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What did it mean when 4 you signed this - - - the language that, you know, no 5 fiduciary representation - - -MR. PERSON: Rule 11. 6 7 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: - - - and all of that? What significance is that? 8 9 MR. PERSON: Well, the certificate or the 10 paragraph 11? The one in the operating agreement or 11 the certificate at the closing? CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: The certificate at 12 13 the closing. MR. PERSON: The certificate at the closing 14 15 was one that the client signed because they had no 16 reason to believe that there was any wrongdoing, any 17 reason to - - -JUDGE READ: Well, weren't they a little 18 19 suspicious, I mean, when - - -2.0 MR. PERSON: I'm sorry? 21 JUDGE READ: Weren't they a little - - -22 couldn't - - - wouldn't you say you should be a 23 little bit suspicious given the big premium they were 2.4 being paid? Wouldn't that have kind of - - - the 1.5 25 and I guess it was - - -

1	MR. PERSON: Well, they never put any money
2	into the transaction.
3	JUDGE CIPARICK: Well, they certainly had a
4	good return on their investment.
5	JUDGE READ: Yeah, they certainly had a
6	good
7	MR. PERSON: There was very little money -
8	this was all a long-term lease. The big
9	the value was a long-term lease, and no one put up
10	money to buy that. It was
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Did you not want to
12	ask any questions, any further questions about this?
13	MR. PERSON: Well, they
14	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: I mean, did
15	nothing that piqued your clients' interest?
16	MR. PERSON: They didn't have any reason to
17	do it until a year later when they
18	JUDGE SMITH: Why did they think that they
19	were being asked to sign this certificate saying
20	there's no fiduciary duty?
21	MR. PERSON: You know, they're only
22	nonlawyers. I mean, they just
23	JUDGE SMITH: Is he correct that counsel
24	was present when this thing was executed?
25	MR. PERSON: Counsel for the LLC was

MR. PERSON: Counsel for the LLC was

1 present and never - - - you know, didn't say 2 anything. I mean, why wouldn't the counsel for the 3 LLC explain that there's a transaction going on? 4 There was a trust there because even the lawyer for 5 the LLC didn't say anything. So there was no reason 6 given for them to question that. JUDGE SMITH: You're saying - - - were you 7 8 your clients represented by counsel at the time this

thing was signed?

MR. PERSON: Yes, they were.

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JUDGE SMITH: What about the fact that you have a sublease so that at least to some degree your clients' return is capped, that is, you can't get more than the rent under the sublease anyway. Well, why doesn't that diminish the relevance of the huge deal that the other partner got?

MR. PERSON: Because the agreement itself, the sublease was carefully drafted so that only the value of the sublease was given to Mr. Tzolis or his associates or his affiliates but to nobody else. Ιf there was any transfer to anyone other than Mr. Tzolis' company, it had to go back and get the approval of all three partners.

JUDGE SMITH: So is that - - - and was that part of the landlord-tenant relationship or part of

1	the LLC relationship; because the landlord-tenant
2	relationship is not fiduciary?
3	MR. PERSON: That was a in the
4	operating agreement, there's a need to have a
5	an agreement of all three partners, and I guess
6	it was unanimous or two out of three if there was any
7	sale of the property. That was built into the
8	agreement.
9	JUDGE SMITH: Including so you're
10	- I guess I'm not fully understanding what the
11	economic deal was here. What was he going to do with
12	the sublease? He wasn't going to move his family
13	into the building.
14	MR. PERSON: No. He was going to create a
15	delicatessen or some kind of a business that he would
16	own and run.
17	JUDGE SMITH: So this was only for him to -
18	
19	MR. PERSON: And he was given permission to
20	do that.
21	JUDGE SMITH: So the sublease was just for
22	him to run his own business.
23	MR. PERSON: That is correct.
24	JUDGE SMITH: And if there was a deal, it
25	was

1 MR. PERSON: That's correct. 2 JUDGE SMITH: - - - there was still a 3 fiduciary relationship. MR. PERSON: That is correct, Your Honor. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: What else, counselor? Anything? 6 MR. PERSON: Well, I - - - the certificate 7 8 actually expired on February 7th, and it was not 9 renewed, so that the closing took place after the 10 certificate had expired, so that actually the 11 certificate drops out because the closing did not 12 take place within the time frame that was set up at 13 the time that the certificate was signed. There was 14 an arrangement to have it be closed by the 20th or 15 something like that of February 2007 - - - or 2 - - -16 February 7th, but the closing took place after that, 17 and other papers were prepared, and there was no additional - - -18 19 JUDGE SMITH: What is the time that you say 20 it expired? Time to do what? I'm sorry. What - - -21 MR. PERSON: Well, the agreement - - - at 22 the time of the delivery of the certificate - - -23 JUDGE SMITH: Uh-huh. 2.4 MR. PERSON: - - - there was a provision 25 that the whole deal would be over if it wasn't closed

1	by February 7th.
2	JUDGE SMITH: But wasn't that extended?
3	MR. PERSON: Well, it was extended only
4	after the fact of the after the passage of time
5	when it was
6	JUDGE SMITH: So you said the certificate
7	died when the time
8	MR. PERSON: Correct.
9	JUDGE SMITH: when the deadline ran
LO	and then when they extended the time, that did not
L1	revive the certificate.
L2	MR. PERSON: They it was not
L3	mentioned in there, and they never created a new
L4	certificate. So at the actual close
L5	JUDGE CIPARICK: The discharge of the
L6	fiduciary relationship was not mentioned there? The
L7	specific discharge of the fiduciary relationship was
L8	not mentioned?
L9	MR. PERSON: The at the actual
20	closing, when all the conditions were met
21	JUDGE CIPARICK: Um-hum.
22	MR. PERSON: we're saying there was
23	no certificate and therefore there was
24	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: So there was no
25	fiduciary responsibility at the time that you signed

1	the certificate, and then by the time of the closing,
2	the fiduciary relationship was back in
3	MR. PERSON: Not at all, Your Honor.
4	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: in place?
5	MR. PERSON: Not at all, Your Honor.
6	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Is that what you're
7	saying?
8	MR. PERSON: The paragraph 11 in the
9	operating agreement does not explicitly say that
10	there is no fiduciary
11	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, but whatever it
12	said
13	MR. PERSON: Well, there always was a
14	fiduciary duty.
15	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: doesn't apply
16	to the actual closing?
17	MR. PERSON: Yes, Your Honor. There was a
18	fiduciary duty up to the date that the certificate
19	was signed, and then if you're taking the argument
20	that the certificate had any value, it was valid
21	_
22	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Whatever value it has
23	was gone.
24	MR. PERSON: Is gone. It's gone.
25	JUDGE SMITH: What the certificate says is

1 in connection with the - - - with their respective 2 assignments to Steve Tzolis of their membership 3 interest in the LLC. Doesn't - - - why doesn't that apply to the assignment even though the time for the 4 5 assignment was retroactively extended? Because it talks about the 6 MR. PERSON: 7 assignment being delivered that day. In that 8 agreement, there's a very specific reference to that 9 assignment, and that assignment was not the 10 assignment that actually assigned the - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: But in substance it was the same, right? 12 13 MR. PERSON: No. I mean, the agreement 14 said - - - on the date they signed that certificate, 15 it referred to an assignment that was delivered that 16 day. 17 JUDGE SMITH: Does it say that day in here? 18 MR. PERSON: Yes. 19 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. I'm having trouble 20 finding it, but I take your word for it. 21 It does say, yeah - - -MR. PERSON: 22 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. 23 MR. PERSON: - - - delivered that day. So 2.4 that's another argument that there really wasn't a 25 certificate at all in this transaction.

1	JUDGE READ: Did you make that argument
2	-
3	MR. PERSON: Thank you.
4	JUDGE READ: Did you make
5	MR. PERSON: I'd reserve three minutes.
6	JUDGE READ: Did you make that argument
7	_
8	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: No, no. You can't
9	reserve, counselor. Judge Read has a question for
10	you anyway.
11	JUDGE READ: I have yeah. Did you
12	make that argument before
13	MR. PERSON: I'm sorry?
14	JUDGE READ: about the expiration of
15	the certificate? Have you made that argument before?
16	MR. PERSON: Yes, yes.
17	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, you can't
18	reserve any time, so anything else you have to say,
19	say it now.
20	MR. PERSON: I've said it, Your Honor.
21	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay.
22	JUDGE SMITH: I found the word "today" by
23	the way. It is in here.
24	MR. PERSON: Okay.
25	CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. Thank you,

1 counselor. 2 JUDGE CIPARICK: Counselor, what about 3 that? 4 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Counselor, rebuttal. 5 JUDGE CIPARICK: Yeah. What about the 6 timing of the assignment? 7 MR. MILONAS: Well, if you look at page 222 8 and 223 of the record, if you do it now, there's an 9 estoppel agreement at paragraph 1, extension of 2/5 10 deadline, "Each assignor and the assignee agree that 11 March 12th, 2007, shall be deemed substituted for the 12 February 5th, 2007, date so that each assignment 13 shall be deemed to have amended to include the" - - to make the new effective date. I mean, they have 14 15 agreed to - - - it's like post adjourning or closing, 16 they adjourned it - - -17 JUDGE CIPARICK: And what date was the 18 closing again? What date was the closing? 19 MR. MILONAS: It's in paragraph 222-223 of 20 the record. There's an estoppel agreement between 21 the parties whereby they extend the closing date 22 basically to the March date, and then everything takes effect as of that date and - - -23 2.4 JUDGE SMITH: What about the theory that

the certificate on itself is limited to that day,

1 anything that didn't happen that day was uncertificated? 2 3 MR. PERSON: I don't - - - I frankly don't 4 understand that argument. If you have a certificate 5 on that day, which waives fiduciary duties 6 retroactively, then that means that that's 7 eliminated? I just don't understand the logic to it all. If that waived fiduciary duties and that it's -8 9 - - and then later on they have a closing where they 10 exchange dollars or whatever they did later, got 11 releases from the landlord, I think this is what you 12 had to do. 13 JUDGE SMITH: Actually, now that I'm 14 looking at it, what it seems to say is "the seller 15 has not relied on any representation except as set 16 forth in the assignment of the documents delivered to 17 the undersigned sellers today." I guess that doesn't 18 really terminate anything. 19 MR. MILONAS: I don't know. 2.0 Any other questions? 21 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Okay. 22 MR. MILONAS: Thank you. 23 CHIEF JUDGE LIPPMAN: Thank you, counselor. 2.4 Thank you both. Appreciate it.

(Court is adjourned)

CERTIFICATION

I, David Rutt, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals matter of Pappas v. Tzolis, No. 193, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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